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Almost all U.S. states allow individuals to disinherit their descendants
for any reason or no reason, but most of the world's legal systems
currently do not. This Article contends that broad freedom of testation
under state law is defensible because it allows elderly people to reward
family members who are caregivers. The Article explores the common-law
origins of freedom of testation, which developed in the shadow of the
medieval rule of primogeniture, a doctrine of no contemporary relevance.
The growing problem of eldercare, however, offers a justification for the
twenty-first century. Increases in life expectancy have led to a sharp rise
in the number of older individuals who require long-term care, and some
children and grandchildren are bearing more of the caregiving burden
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than others. Recent econometric studies, not yet taken into account in legal
scholarship, suggest a tendency among the American elderly to bequeath
more property to caregiving children. A competent testator, rather than a
court or legislature, is in the best position to decide how much care each
person has provided and to reward caregivers accordingly. Law reform,
therefore, should focus on strengthening testamentary freedom while
ensuring that caregivers are adequately compensated in cases of intestacy.
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INTRODUCTION
By all accounts, Leona Helmsley had a special relationship with her
dog, "Trouble."' Those who knew the billionaire real estate magnate
and luxury hotelier were not surprised, therefore, by news reports
shortly after her death naming Helmsley's beloved canine companion
as the beneficiary of a $12 million trust.2 When Helmsley's will
became public, however, the document revealed a disapproval of two
of Helmsley's four grandchildren just as strong as her passion for
Trouble. Two of the grandchildren, all of whom were children of
Helmsley's predeceased son, Jay Panzirer, received $5 million each
plus additional distributions on the condition that they visit their
father's grave "at least once each calendar year." Nevertheless,
Helmsley continued, "I have not made any provisions in this Will for
my grandson Craig Panzirer or my granddaughter Meegan Panzirer for
reasons which are known to them."3 This statement fueled immediate
speculation as to why Helmsley cut Craig and Meegan out of the will,4
but the truth was probably buried with Helmsley.
Helmsley died in Connecticut, which, like every American state save
Louisiana, has long allowed testators to disinherit their children and
grandchildren for any reason or no reason.5  In cases involving
' According to Helmsley's former bodyguard, Trouble was her first priority, followed
by herself, then the Park Lane Hotel. Lindsay Fortado & Patricia Hurtado, Leona Helmsley
Leaves $12 Million to Her Dog, Trouble, BLOOMBERG, Aug. 29, 2007,
httpJ/www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601115&sid=aAliThuAnS7z4&refer=muse.
2 See, e.g., Helmsley's Will: Dog - $12 Million, 2 Grandkids - $0, CNBC.com,
Aug. 29, 2007, http://www.cnbc.com/id/20491003 (AP Report). Helmsley's former
real estate rival Donald Trump was quoted as saying, "The dog is the only thing that
loved her and deserves every single penny of it." Fortado & Hurtado, supra note 1.
Trouble's newfound wealth has had a downside, however. See Helmsley's Dog Getting
Death Threats: $12 Million Legacy Apparently Sparks Problems for "Trouble," Leona's
Pampered Pooch, CBS, Nov. 26, 2007, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/11/26/
earlyshow/leisure/celebspot/main3539580.shtml.
3 See Last Will and Testament of Leona M. Helmsley at 3, N.Y. DAILY NEWS,
http://multimedia.nydailynews.con/pdf/2007/08/28/leona-helmsley.will (last visited
Sept. 9, 2008); see also Alan Feuer, Helmsley, Through Will, Is Still Calling the Shots,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2007, at B2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/30/
nyregion/30leona/html?ref=nyregion.
I An anonymous Wikipedia editor suggested that Craig and Meegan's failure to
name any of their own children after their father precipitated the disinheritance. See
Wills, Trusts & Estates Prof. Blog, Craig and Meegan's Million Dollar Mistake? (Aug.
30, 2007), http://Aawprofessors.typepad.com/trusts-estates-prof/2007/08/craig-and-
meega.html.
5 Even in Louisiana, protection of children from intentional disinheritance has
recently been significantly curtailed. See infra text accompanying note 38.
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donative transfers, courts in the United States follow the donor's
intention unless prohibited by law. U.S. law does not protect
descendants from intentional disinheritance.6 Had Helmsley been
domiciled outside the United States, however, foreign law might have
limited her ability to disinherit her grandchildren. Most countries in
Continental Europe guarantee a testator's descendants a fixed share of
the estate with limited exceptions. At the same time, several countries
in the British Commonwealth give wide discretion to judges to amend
a testator's estate plan in order to provide for certain members of the
testator's family. Moreover, had Helmsley died intestate, every U.S.
jurisdiction would have allowed her grandchildren to take by
representation of their deceased father.7 Nevertheless, if Helmsley's
will was validly executed,8 under the laws of Connecticut - or New
York, where much of Helmsley's property was located - the so-called
"Queen of Mean" was free to leave her grandchildren nothing. 9
In recent years, many scholars have compared the U.S. regime
allowing freedom of testation to the various alternatives. 10 Some of
6 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.6
cmt. i (2005); id. § 10.1 cmt. c (2003).
7 "Representation" refers to the various schemes by which property is divided
when there are descendants beyond the first generation. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.3 (1999).
8 As this Article was being edited for publication, the New York Post reported a
settlement between Helmsley's heirs and beneficiaries, in which the disinherited
grandchildren were given a share (and Trouble's share drastically reduced) to avoid a
will contest by the disinherited grandchildren, who alleged that their grandmother
lacked the mental capacity to execute a will. See Dareh Gregorian, Screw the Pooch:
Leona's Pup Loses $10M of Trust Fund, N.Y. POST, June 16, 2008,
http://www.nypost.com/seven/06162008/news/regionalnews/screw-the-pooch 11571
5.htm. On the role of will contests as a de facto check on testamentary freedom in the
United States, see infra Part II. As it turns out, however, the charitable trust funded by
Helmsley's will may benefit many dogs other than Trouble. See Stephanie Strom,
Helmsley Left Dogs Billions in Her Will, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2008, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/02/us/02gift.html.
9 The law of the decedent's domicile at death governs the disposition of personal
property, while situs law governs the disposition of real property. See 1 JEFFREY A.
SCHOENBLUM, MULTISTATE AND MULTINATIONAL ESTATE PLANNING § 14.05 [A], at 14-21
(2008 ed.).
10 For examples of recent comparative scholarship, see RALPH C. BRASHIER,
INHERITANCE LAW AND THE EVOLVING FAMILY 90-120 (2004); RONALD CHESTER, FROM
HERE TO ETERNITY? PROPERTY AND THE DEAD HAND 81-92 (2007); Deborah A. Batts, I
Didn't Ask to be Born: The American Law of Disinheritance and a Proposal for a Change
to a System of Protected Inheritance, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1197 (1990); Ralph C. Brashier,
Disinheritance and the Modern Family, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 83 (1994); Ralph C.
Brashier, Protecting the Child from Disinheritance: Must Louisiana Stand Alone?, 57 LA.
L. REV. 1 (1996) [hereinafter Brashier, Protecting the Child]; Ronald Chester,
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these scholars have criticized the U.S. approach, suggesting that the
United States would be better off adopting some variant of a forced
heirship regime or Commonwealth-style family maintenance system. A
few commentators would seek to protect from disinheritance not only
minor or disabled descendants, but also adult, nondisabled descendants,
as is the case in many European and Commonwealth countries.
Proponents of other inheritance regimes have thoroughly explained
their merits.11 Their arguments sometimes assume, however, that there
is no contemporary justification for allowing unlimited freedom of
testation. 12  Recent commentary on the U.S. rule suggests that it
emerged for reasons that are no longer relevant or that fail to address
modem societal problems. This Article questions that premise.
Specifically, this Article highlights a pragmatic justification for
broadly empowering testators to disinherit adult, non-disabled
descendants, and explains how the American law of inheritance could
Disinheritance and the American Child: An Alternative from British Columbia, 1998
UTAH L. REV. 1 [hereinafter Chester, American Child]; Ronald Chester, Should
American Children Be Protected Against Disinheritance?, 32 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
405 (1997) [hereinafter Chester, Children]; Frances H. Foster, Linking Support and
Inheritance: A New Model From China, 1999 Wis. L. REV. 1199, 1217 [hereinafter
Foster, Linking Support]; Frances H. Foster, Towards a Behavior-Based Model of
Inheritance? The Chinese Experiment, 32 UC DAVIS L. REV. 77 (1998) [hereinafter
Foster, Behavior-Based Model]; Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in
Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1165 (1986); Jennifer R.
Boone Hargis, Solving Injustice in Inheritance Laws Through Judicial Discretion:
Common Sense Solutions from Common Law Tradition, 2 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV.
447 (2003); Kristine S. Knaplund, Grandparents Raising Grandchildren and the
Implications for Inheritance, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 9-16 (2006); Thomas Oldham, What
Does the U.S. System Regarding Inheritance Rights of Children Reveal About American
Families?, 33 FAM. L.Q. 265 (1999); Katherine Shaw Spaht, Forced Heirship Changes:
The Regrettable "Revolution" Completed, 57 LA. L. REV. 55 (1996); Tamara York,
Protecting Minor Children from Parental Disinheritance: A Proposal for Awarding a
Compulsory Share of the Parental Estate, 1997 DET. C.L. REV. 861; and Brian C.
Brennan, Note, Disinheritance of Dependent Children: Why Isn't America Fulfilling Its
Moral Obligation?, 14 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 125 (1999).
" Among American scholars, Deborah Batts has made the principal case for forced
heirship, while Ronald Chester has, until recently, led the charge for family
maintenance. See, e.g., Batts, supra note 10, at 1201 (proposing "that a duty of
continuing responsibility of parent for child should be incorporated into the law of
testate succession so that testamentary freedom for the property owner with children
is more circumscribed than it is presently in most American jurisdictions"); Chester,
Children, supra note 10, at 408 (arguing that "the United States should adopt the
English and Commonwealth system of family maintenance, particularly as practiced in
the Canadian Province of British Columbia").
12 See, e.g., Batts, supra note 10, at 1243 (suggesting that "historic reasons for
favoring testamentary freedom over the interests of children . . . are no longer
persuasive").
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be revised in light of that justification. 13 The thesis of the Article is
that, although the U.S. rule may have emerged for historical reasons
that no longer have much force, recent demographic changes have
strengthened the case for the rule and have widened its field of
application. Once a punishment inflicted primarily on wayward
progeny, disinheritance of adult, non-disabled descendants has
become an unfortunate but necessary consequence of the need to
reward those who care for their aging parents or grandparents. The
new paradigm of the disinheriting testator may not be Helmsley, who
could rely on her immense wealth for support, but rather the loving
parent who wants to leave her few possessions to the child who took
on the heavy responsibility of eldercare. Facilitating the goals of the
latter parent, however, may mean continuing to allow the Leona
Helmsleys of the world to disinherit their descendants for any reason.
The phenomenon of eldercare is not a new one. Descendants have
long felt compelled to take care of elders who need assistance. What
has changed is the number of elders requiring such care.14 As the so-
called "baby boom" generation - those born in the few decades
following the Second World War - ages, the number of elderly
individuals in developed countries is expected to rise rapidly.15 The
number of Americans age eighty-five and older, which was just under
1.0 million in 1960 and approximately 4.2 million in 2000, is expected
to rise to between 14.3 and 53.9 million by 2040.16 Moreover, the
percentage of the overall U.S. population aged sixty-five and older is
expected to increase from thirteen percent in 2000 to twenty percent
by 2030.1' Someone will need to provide care for these elderly
Americans, and the most likely candidates are their children and
grandchildren.
In a study conducted in 2004, the National Alliance for Caregiving
and AARP estimated that approximately twenty-one percent of the
adult population in the United States provides unpaid formal or
informal care to an adult age eighteen or over. 8 Eighty-three percent
13 The Article does not take a position on what protection should be offered to
minor or disabled children, a worthy topic in its own right.
" See Peggie R. Smith, Elder Care, Gender, and Work: The Work-Family Issue of the
21st Century, 25 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 351, 355-59 (2004).
15 KEVIN KINSELLA & VICTORIA A. VELKOFF, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, AN AGING WORLD: 2001, at 1 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/2001pubs/p95-01-1 .pdf.
16 Id. at 31 fig.3-8.
17 Id. at 10.
'8 NAT'L ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING AND AARP, CAREGIVING IN THE U.S. 6 (2004)
[hereinafter CAREGIVING], available at http://www.caregiving.org/data/04
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of these caregivers provide care for a relative, and, where the recipient
of care is over fifty years old, the recipient is most commonly the
caregiver's mother, father, or grandmother. 9 Women bear a greater
share of the caregiving burden.2 ° More than a third of those providing
care do so on their own, without any assistance from siblings or other
relatives. 2' The value of unpaid care provided for adults in the United
States is about $257 billion per year.2  Eldercare imposes an
emotional and financial strain on the family members who provide it,
and these caregivers deserve to be rewarded accordingly. Doing so,
however, may mean allowing care recipients to leave less, or even
nothing, to those who have not assumed their share of the eldercare
responsibility. Empirical research, discussed in this Article, suggests
that some care recipients are currently using testamentary freedom for
exactly this purpose.23 A care recipient, rather than a judge or jury,
has the best information regarding the provision of care and should be
allowed to act upon it when competent.24
The eldercare problem is not the only possible justification for the
U.S. preference for freedom of testation. American individualism,
finalreport.pdf.
19 Id. at 34-35.
20 The AARP study found that 61 percent of caregivers are women. Id. at 8. Other
studies have found that women provide between 70 and 75 percent of eldercare
services. See Smith, supra note 14, at 360 n.55; see also Susan C. Eaton, Eldercare in
the United States: Inadequate, Inequitable, but Not a Lost Cause, FEMINIST ECON., July
2005, at 37-38 (noting that "[miuch of the responsibility for long-term care continues
to fall on families, and it is largely women - many of them over the age of 55 - who
provide such care").
21 CAREGIVING, supra note 18, at 10.
22 Id. at 3 (citing Peter S. Arno, Albert Einstein Coll. Of Med., Economic Value of
Informal Caregiving: 2000, Presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American
Association for Geriatric Psychiatry, (Feb. 24, 2002), available at
http://www.thefamilycaregiver.org/pdfs/pa2000.ppt).
23 This is not to say that testamentary freedom is the solution to the problem of
eldercare. There is much more that employers and the government could do to help
caregivers and care recipients. See, e.g., Richard L. Kaplan, Retirement Planning's
Greatest Gap: Funding Long-Term Care, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 407, 448-50 (2007)
(proposing changes to Medicare and standardization of long-term care insurance
contracts); Matthew Pakula, A Federal Filial Responsibility Statute: A Uniform Tool to
Help Combat the Wave of Indigent Elderly, 39 FAM. L.Q. 859, 870-77 (2005) (suggesting
that federal government enact filial responsibility statute); Smith, supra note 14, at
393-98 (proposing amendments to Family and Medical Leave Act).
24 The inefficiency of third-party interference with norm-based relationships has
been pointed out in other contexts. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter,
The Enforceability of Norms and the Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1913,
1932-40 (1996) (defending lack of court supervision of at-will employment
contracts).
University of California, Davis
problems with the U.S. probate system, the shift to human capital as
the dominant form of inheritance, and many other factors may also
provide some support for a power to disinherit, along with the basic
argument that inheritance is a windfall for children of the rich.25
Moreover, wayward children will continue to disappoint their parents,
and there remain many reasons other than caregiving for why a parent
might wish to disinherit a particular descendant.2 6 We must consider
all aspects of the problem in evaluating the claim that U.S. law's
commitment to testamentary freedom has allowed parents to abandon
obligations toward their children. 7 This Article seeks only to call
attention to the growing and accelerating problem of eldercare and its
impact on testamentary freedom. 8
This Article is divided into five parts. Part I compares the U.S. rule
to the existing foreign alternatives, principally the forced-heirship
regime of Continental Europe and the Commonwealth family
maintenance scheme. It then evaluates some of the arguments critics
have made against the U.S. regime. Part II examines the likely origins
of the U.S. rule in the English common law of inheritance, explaining
how testamentary freedom in the common law originally emerged in
the shadow of primogeniture. Part III discusses possible
contemporary justifications for the U.S. rule, other than the problem
of eldercare. Part IV then turns to the eldercare phenomenon and
what bearing it has on the arguments for and against disinheritance.
Recent econometric studies, not yet taken into account by legal
scholars, suggest that parents who divide their estates unequally tend
25 See infra Part IV.
26 See, e.g., Ramsey v. Taylor, 999 P.2d 1178, 1187 (Or. 2000) (refusing to set
aside estate plan of testator who favored his paramour on ground that his son and
grandsons had, for several years, "been more concerned with my wealth than my well
being"). A parent might also wish to leave more to a child or grandchild who is
disabled or who has greater financial need.
27 For this claim, see, for example, Batts, supra note 10, at 1197. The response
that follows does not require the reader to agree with Judge Batts that parents have an
obligation to support adult, non-disabled children, a claim with implications outside
the estate planning context. Moreover, the application of the parental obligation
argument to grandchildren and more remote lineal descendants is far from clear.
Nonetheless, this Article takes as a starting point that there may be some valid case for
protecting adult, non-disabled descendants from disinheritance, as the legal systems of
most Western countries currently do. See infra text accompanying notes 34-47.
28 This Article will not consider the possible constitutional arguments against new
limitations on freedom of testation, which are not insignificant in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987). On these issues, see Lee-ford
Tritt, Liberating Estates Law from the Constraints of Copyright, 38 RUTGERs LJ. 109,
130-32 (2006).
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to reward caregivers with a greater share. In light of this finding,
Part V suggests possible improvements to the current regime,
including how courts and legislatures might reform contract law to
treat caregivers more fairly when the care recipient dies intestate.
I. THE U.S. RULE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Many Americans may be unaware of the extent to which the U.S.
position on disinheritance differs from the positions taken by other
developed legal systems around the world. Legal scholars, however,
have not ignored the difference, and some have argued that the U.S.
approach lacks a sound policy basis. This Part will offer some context
for the U.S. rule, comparing it to the most common alternatives and
discussing the various critiques that have been offered against it.
A. Children and Inheritance: Three Legal Traditions
In the United States, the basic rule is that a parent can disinherit a
child or grandchild for any reason or no reason. However, this general
rule is subject to some limitations. For instance, when a child is born
or adopted after the making of the will, and the testator fails to
provide for that child, the child may have a claim as a
"pretermitted" - overlooked - child.29 In some jurisdictions, a child
born before the will's execution may also have a claim if the testator
failed to mention the child in the will.3" In every American state
except Louisiana, however, a child or other descendant alive at the
time of the will's execution and expressly disinherited in the will has
no claim to receive a share of the estate.3 This is true regardless of the
age of the disinherited individual, although in the case of a child of
29 See, e.g., UNlF. PROBATE CODE § 2-302 (1990) (awarding omitted child intestate
share under certain conditions). As of this writing, the Uniform Probate Code
drafting committee is considering amendments to the provisions relating to
inheritance rights of children, especially those children who are adopted or conceived
by assisted reproduction. See E. Gary Spitko, Open Adoption, Inheritance, and the
"Uncleing" Principle, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 765, 782-86 (2008).
30 See, e.g., In re Estate of Hastings, 567 P.2d 200, 203 (Wash. 1977) (allowing
preexisting child to qualify as pretermitted); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.6 cmt. d (2003) (noting variation among
jurisdictions); 80 AM. JUR. 2D Wills § 1539 (1975) (explaining that protection of
preexisting children is minority rule); JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND
ESTATES 270 (7th ed. 2005) (comparing modem statutes to traditional common-law
approach).
31 See, e.g., Batts, supra note 10, at 1198. In addition to Louisiana, Puerto Rico has
a forced heirship statute. Chester, Children, supra note 10, at 441-43.
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divorced parents, some states provide that child support obligations
survive the death of the parent obligated to furnish such support.32
With this limited qualification, a parent has no obligation to provide
support even for a minor child after death.33
The approach of the United States contrasts sharply with those of
civil law and Commonwealth jurisdictions around the world. In most
civil law jurisdictions, descendants are generally entitled to a reserved
share of the estate unless interested parties show some specific
grounds for disinheritance.34 In Austria, for example, a child is
entitled to one-half of the amount she would have inherited under the
intestacy rules unless the child was (1) convicted of a crime and
sentenced to twenty years or more as punishment; (2) committed an
offense against the testator that involved intent and was punishable by
more than a year's imprisonment; or (3) grossly neglected duties of
care and support to the testator when the testator was in a position of
need.35  Similar provisions are found in most Continental legal
systems, although the grounds for disinheritance vary.36 In these
32 York, supra note 10, at 882-85. This is the minority view. See id. at 882 &
n.146 (listing jurisdictions in which death of obligor extinguishes obligation to pay
future child support in absence of contrary separation agreement or decree).
33 On the other hand, in almost all common-law states, a surviving spouse has a
right to some fixed share of the estate, regardless of how much is left to that spouse in
the will. This is generally referred to as the surviving spouse's elective share. See, e.g.,
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (1990) (defining elective share amount).
34 See John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Redesigning the Spouse's
Forced Share, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 303, 304 (1987). The share to which a
child is entitled by forced heirship may be distinct from his or her intestate share. See
SCHOENBLUM, supra note 9, § 12.02[A], at 12-4 (discussing French system).
35 DAVID HAYTON, EUROPEAN SUCCESSION LAws 11[ 2.47-51, at 323-33 (2d ed.
2002).
36 In Greece, for example, there are five grounds for disinheritance of descendants:
(1) attempting to take the life of the testator, the testator's spouse, or other
descendants; (2) willfully causing bodily harm to the testator or the testator's spouse;
(3) intentionally committing grave felonies or grave misdemeanors against the testator
or the testator's spouse; (4) maliciously violating their legal obligation to sustain the
testator; or (5) leading an immoral or amoral life against the wishes of the testator.
The last of these grounds does not apply when the will was written long before the
testator's death and the descendant has reformed himself or herself in the meantime.
Id. 11 10.71, at 290-91. Committing a serious crime or tort against the testator or the
testator's close family is grounds for disinheritance in Portugal. Id. 1 16.71, at 421. In
Switzerland, the grounds are committing a serious offence against the testator or the
testator's family or seriously failing in the duties incumbent on the heir with regard to
the testator or the testator's family. Id. l 19.75, at 492. The existence of these
grounds for disinheritance has led to a rich tradition of "unworthy heir" litigation in
civil-law jurisdictions. See Paula Monopoli, "Deadbeat Dads": Should Support and
Inheritance Be Linked?, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 257, 259 n.8 (1994) (citing conversation
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jurisdictions, therefore, the baseline rule is precisely the opposite of
the U.S. rule - a presumption in favor of inheritance notwithstanding
the testamentary disposition.37
Because of its civil law tradition, Louisiana has a system of forced
heirship similar to that in place in Continental Europe. However, the
state legislature amended the system in 1995 to apply only to children
who are under the age of twenty-four, permanently disabled, or likely
to become permanently disabled in the future due to an "inherited,
incurable disease or condition. ''3' Although the testator has the
freedom to bequeath a substantial part of the estate to persons of the
testator's choosing, the statute reserves a certain portion, called the
legitime, for qualified children and other lineal descendants entitled to
take by representation. 39  Grounds for disinheritance in Louisiana
include (1) injuring, cruelly treating, or attempting to kill a parent; (2)
unjustly accusing the parent of a serious crime (one punishable by life
imprisonment or death); (3) committing a serious crime; (4)
interfering with the parent's attempt to make a will; (5) marrying
while a minor without the parent's permission; and (6) failing to
communicate with the parent for two years without just cause after
attaining the age of majority and knowing how to contact the parent. °
Unless one of these limited grounds for disinheritance is shown, a
with John Langbein).
37 This presumption has a long pedigree. See Raymond Westbrook, The Character
of Ancient Near Eastern Law, Introduction in 1 A HISTORY OF ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN
LAw 1, 56-60 (Raymond Westbrook ed., 2003) (explaining that principle of forced
heirship applied throughout ancient Near East, although Egypt of the New Kingdom
allowed father to disinherit some of his children in favor of others).
38 LA. CONST. art. 12, § 5; LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1493 (2000 & Supp. 2008); see
also Spaht, supra note 10, at 68-77 (analyzing changes). Although Louisiana has
abolished its forced share for most adult children, disabled adult children remain
protected, but the exception is ambiguous. See Stewart v. Estate of Stewart, 966 So. 2d
1241, 1243-44 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that child with bipolar disorder qualified
under statute although she was "not permanently incapable of taking care of herself in
the literal sense"); In re Succession of Ardoin, 957 So. 2d 937, 944-45 (La. Ct. App.
2007) (reaching same result on similar facts); Katherine Shaw Spaht, The Remnant of
Forced Heirship: The Interrelationship of Undue Influence, What's Become of
Disinherison, and the Unfinished Business of the Stepparent Usufruct, 60 LA. L. REV. 637,
643-47 (2000). As stated above, supra note 13, this Article does not take a position on
the inheritance rights of minor or disabled children.
39 The amount of the legitime is one-fourth if one forced heir survives and one-half
if two or more forced heirs survive; descendants are entitled to a claim as forced heirs
by representation only in limited circumstances. LA. CiV. CODE ANN. arts. 1493-95
(2000).
40 Failure to communicate is excused if the child is on active duty in the United
States military. Id. art. 1621(A)(8) (Supp. 2008).
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parent cannot disinherit a child who qualifies under the statute of that
child's share of the legitime.4' Grounds for disinheritance, moreover,
may be challenged in court after the testator's death, although the
disinherited child bears the burden of proof.42 Because of the 1995
amendments, however, the statute no longer protects nondisabled
children twenty-four years or older. Testators may disinherit these
children in Louisiana just as in the rest of the United States.
Certain countries of the British Commonwealth, including England,
Wales, New Zealand, Australia, and some parts of Canada follow
another alternative to the U.S. rule that may be referred to as the
"family maintenance" system.43  In these jurisdictions, courts have
wide discretion to depart from a testator's -estate plan to provide for a
class of persons protected by legislation, typically including specified
members of the testator's family.' The statute of New South Wales,
Australia is illustrative. It begins by defining a list of "eligible
persons," including spouses, domestic partners, .former spouses,
children, and dependent grandchildren.45 It then provides that when
the testator insufficiently provides for an eligible person, the court
"may order that such provision be made out of the estate ... as, in the
opinion of the Court, ought, having regard to the circumstances at the
time the order is made, to be made for the maintenance, education, or
advancement in life of the eligible person. '46 The statute allows the
court to consider (1) contributions that eligible persons make to "the
acquisition, conservation, or improvement of property of the deceased
person" or "the welfare of the deceased person"; (2) the "character and
conduct of the eligible person before and after the death of the
deceased person"; (3) "circumstances existing before and after the
4' Id. art. 1620 (Supp. 2008).
42 Id. art. 1624 (Supp. 2008).
43 The word "maintenance" has been used since the early 20th century to describe
the provision made for the testator's family under this system. See, e.g., 2 BURGE'S
COMMENTARIES ON COLONIAL AND FOREIGN LAWS 580 n.(f) (Alexander Wood Renton &
George Greenville Phillimore eds., Sweet & Maxwell new ed. 1908) (discussing New
Zealand statute).
44 The statutes apply to both testate and intestate succession. See Langbein &
Waggoner, supra note 34, at 304 n.6. New Zealand was a trailblazer among the
Commonwealth countries, adopting the first family maintenance statute in 1900. See
Joseph Laufer, Flexible Restraints on Testamentary Freedom: A Report on Decedents'
Family Maintenance Legislation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 277, 282 (1955). On the origins of
family maintenance legislation in England, see Elizabeth High, Note, Tension Between
Testamentary Freedom and Parental Support Obligations: A Comparison between the
United States and Great Britain, 17 CORNELL INT'LL.J. 321, 323-30 (1984).
45 Family Provision Act, 1982, § 6 (N.S.W.) (Austl.).
46 Id. § 7.
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death of the deceased person"; and (4) "any other matter which it
considers relevant in the circumstances."
47
The efficacy and merit of family maintenance systems such as that in
New South Wales depend on the insight of the judge making the
distribution. The judge becomes a surrogate testator, adjusting the
testator's estate plan to reflect her own view of an adequate provision
for the testator's deceased family. It is interesting, therefore, that
courts in family maintenance jurisdictions sometimes award provision
to a child despite allegations of notoriously bad conduct. For
example, in the New South Wales case Wheatley v. Wheatley, the court
awarded provision to the testator's son, who was disinherited in favor
of his sister. This was despite the testator's allegations of
"disrespectful volatile, physical and vocal abuse" of both the testator
and her daughter by the son. The court held that provision for a child
would not be "withheld as punishment for perceived bad conduct on
the part of the applicant."4" Similarly, another New South Wales court
increased the share of one daughter beyond what her mother
bequeathed her, notwithstanding the mother's reported statement that
the daughter physically and verbally abused her sister and refused to
speak to her mother.49 Whether or not these decisions cast doubt on
the wisdom of the family maintenance system, they certainly highlight
how different that system is from the U.S. rule."° Rather than leave the
41 Id. The inheritance system in China also delegates much discretion to courts,
but it focuses on the "conduct of heirs and claimants toward the decedent." See
Foster, Behavior-Based Model, supra note 10, at 81.
48 Wheatley v. Wheatley (2005) N.S.W.S.C. 785 9[ 35, 46, 55 (Austl.), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/supreme-ct/2005/785.html. The basis for the
order was "the [son's] health problems, which appear to be genuine and which are
largely the cause of his reduced circumstances and lifestyle." Id. 1 52.
49 Mikulic v. Pub. Tr. (2006) N.S.W.S.C. 256 '1 4, 74 (Austl.), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/supreme-ct/2006/256.html. The mother had
apparently left her two daughters equal shares of the residue, but the court decided to
increase the residuary share of one daughter, Mira, to 60% on the basis of her greater
financial need, and also significantly reduce various specific bequests to other
relatives, despite the mother's statements regarding Mira's alleged negative behavior
toward her mother and sister. Id. TI 2, 68, 74. In e-mail correspondence with this
author, Mira defended the court's judgment on the grounds that she, not her sister,
had done more to help her mother in time of need, and that she had not in fact
mistreated her mother as suggested in the will. See E-mail from Mira Mikulic to
Joshua C. Tate, Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University (Apr. 26,
2008, 23:58 EDT) (on file with author).
50 England and Wales also grant courts a large degree of discretion under a family
maintenance statute. Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act, 1975, c.
63 (U.K.). The applicable statute permits a person who is enumerated in the statute to
apply to a court for an order of provision out of the estate if the will or intestate
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decision of how to divide the estate to the testator, family maintenance
systems transfer this power to a judge, who divides the estate after the
testator's death without any personal experience of the relevant facts.5
This reassignment of power typifies the wide gulf between other
western countries and the U.S. in the latter's recognition of an
unlimited power to disinherit descendants.
B. The Limits of Testamentary Freedom
Nevertheless, this power to disinherit is more limited in reality than
the black-letter law suggests. Through substantive doctrines and
procedural mechanisms, the U.S. legal system has checked absolute
testamentary freedom. These legal institutions include the doctrine of
undue influence; rules concerning mental capacity, fraud, and duress;
and the right to trial by jury in probate proceedings.
In practice, when a testator disinherits her descendants, this may
lead to a postmortem will contest. In separate articles published in the
mid-1990s, Melanie Leslie and Ray Madoff argued that courts tend to
manipulate the doctrine of undue influence to undo testamentary
disposition of the deceased's property does not make reasonable financial provision
for the applicant. Id. §§ 1-2. Possible claimants include spouses and former spouses
of the deceased, children of the deceased, and any person being maintained, wholly or
partly, by the deceased. Id. § 1. When determining whether reasonable financial
provision has been made for the applicant, and if not, the size of the order to make,
the court is directed to consider factors such as the financial resources and needs of
the applicant and other beneficiaries; the obligations and responsibilities of the
decedent; "the size and nature of the net estate"; and "any other matter, including the
conduct of the applicant or any other person, which in the circumstances of the case
the court may consider relevant." Id. § 3(1). As in the New South Wales family
maintenance system, judges in England and Wales are granted a great deal of
discretion in making provision for applicants which may produce similarly
questionable results. Id. § 2; see, e.g., In re Land, [2006] EWHC (Ch.) 2069, [1011]-
[12] (U.K.) (ordering that provision be made for claimant despite reported evidence
that he permitted his mother to suffer painful death while he was being paid to care
for her, which led to four-year sentence for manslaughter). The birth of family
maintenance in England has been attributed to the fact that, unlike the United States
or Continental Europe, England offered no protection to spouses from disinheritance
until the enactment of the statute. See Glendon, supra note 10, at 1186-87.
"' For a discussion of a few cases from British Columbia that "might bother many
Americans," see CHESTER, supra note 10, at 87-88. In Sawchuh v. MacKenzie Estate, for
example, the British Columbia Court of Appeals awarded $1 million to the testator's
daughter, who was only devised $10,000 in the will, on the ground that "a judicious
parent would recognize a moral obligation to provide for a substantially higher
standard of living." Sawchuk v. MacKenzie Estate, [2000] 72 B.C.L.R.3d 333 'H 18,
24 (Can.), available at http://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcca/doc/2000/2000bccal0/
2000bccalO.html.
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dispositions that fail to provide adequately for the "natural" objects of
the testator's bounty.12 The doctrine of undue influence allows the
court to set aside a testamentary disposition when the beneficiary or a
related party interfered with the testator's competent volition by
substituting his desire for that of the testator. Although the doctrine
can apply to bequests in favor of children or other relatives as well as
unrelated parties, in practice courts tend to find undue influence only
when the beneficiary is not related to the testator. 3 If the will leaves
most or all of the estate to the testator's spouse or blood relatives, the
court is more likely to consider the bequest "natural" and will not
overturn it on the ground of undue influence.54
The doctrine of undue influence, therefore, may serve in reality as a
check on testamentary freedom. A similar analysis could be applied to
will contests involving the testator's mental capacity,55 fraud, 6 or
duress.5 All of these doctrines allow courts to undo testamentary
dispositions that fail to provide for the testator's children or other
close relatives. Moreover, another protection that descendants have
against disinheritance in the United States, at least in some states, is
the availability of jury trial in the probate process. 8 In jurisdictions
that allow trial by jury in will contest proceedings, disinherited
descendants will have an opportunity to testify before a jury about the
52 Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 236-
37, 245-46 (1996); Ray D. Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L. REV. 571,
589-92 (1997). But see Susanna L. Blumenthal, The Deviance of the Will: Policing the
Bounds of Testamentary Freedom in Nineteenth-Century America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 959,
964 (2006) (arguing that "legal contests over deviant wills are instead best read as
evidence of deep and abiding tensions in the liberal conception of the 'free agent"').
53 Leslie, supra note 52, at 243-44.
54 Madoff, supra note 52, at 602.
11 See, e.g., In re Strittmater's Estate, 53 A.2d 205 (NJ. 1947) (invalidating
testamentary disposition in favor of women's rights organization on theory that
testator suffered from insane delusion that men were evil), discussed in DUKEMINIER ET
AL., supra note 30, at 149-50. The doctrine of insane delusion (also known as
monomania) at issue in Strittmater has recently been criticized as ill-conceived, and
unnecessary, given the existence of general rules concerning mental capacity. See
Bradley E.S. Fogel, The Completely Insane Law of Partial Insanity: The Impact of
Monomania on Testamentary Capacity, 42 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 67, 102-11 (2007).
56 See, e.g., Puckett v. Krida, 1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 502 (1994) (setting aside on
grounds of fraud bequest made in favor of nurses who cared for testator).
17 See, e.g., Latham v. Father Divine, 85 N.E.2d 168 (N.Y. 1949) (allowing
complaint to go forward on theory that bequest in favor of religious organization was
procured by duress).
58 See John H. Langbein, Will Contests, 103 YALE LJ. 2039, 2043 (1994)
(reviewing DAVID MARGOLICK, UNDUE INFLUENCE: THE Epic BATTLE FOR THE JOHNSON &
JOHNSON FORTUNE (1993)).
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scheming behavior of the nonrelative beneficiary.59 Jurors might
sympathize with the disinherited child and find undue influence or
lack of mental capacity, if the trial even proceeds to that stage. In
some cases, the beneficiary, terrified that the jury will give the child
everything, will settle.6"
Although will contests do impose a limitation on the freedom of
testation in the United States, their importance should not be
exaggerated. A 1987 study of Tennessee probate records found that
will contests occurred in less than one percent of probated wills.61
There are many reasons why disinherited children or grandchildren
might not bring a will contest. These include a perception that the
reasons for disinheritance were fair, a reluctance to have the family's
dirty laundry aired out in court, or a lack of knowledge about the legal
avenues available.62 Moreover, a skilled estate planner can always take
steps to make a will contest less likely or less likely to succeed. For
instance, planners may gather evidence of capacity before death,
making sure that potential witnesses see that the testator is competent.
They may also draft an effective no-contest clause in the will.63 Thus a
good estate planner can make disinheritance of children or
grandchildren effective, unless the testator obviously lacks
testamentary capacity or competent volition.
59 See id. (noting that "Itirying a will contest to a panel of lay persons invites
litigation such as the Seward Johnson case, in which the strategy is to evoke the jurors'
sympathy for disinherited offspring and to excite their likely hostility towards a
devisee such as Basia, who can so easily be painted as a homewrecking adventurer").
60 See id. Langbein details how Seward Johnson disinherited his adult children, to
whom he had already given millions in trust, in favor of his wife, who was 40 years his
junior, and how his children forced her to settle their meritless will contest for $40
million and $25 million in legal fees (his total estate being $400 million). Id. at 2039-41.
6 Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Will Contests-An Empirical Study, 22 REAL PROP. PROB.
& TR.J. 607, 614 (1987). Will contests may have been more common in earlier stages
of American history, although the limited research to date (focusing on California) has
produced contradictory findings. Compare Lawrence M. Friedman et al., The
Inheritance Process in San Bernardino County, California, 1964: A Research Note, 43
Hous. L. REV. 1445, 1453, 1467-69 (2007) (finding only seven contested wills in
sample of 342 testate probate files from San Bernardino County in 1964), with Kristine
S. Knaplund, The Evolution of Women's Rights in Inheritance, 19 HASTINGS WOMEN'S UJ.
3, 30-31 (2008) (finding that 11 of 108 wills probated in Los Angeles County in 1893
were formally contested and another seven cases resulted in distributions different
from those in will).
62 Schoenblum, supra note 61, at 614-15.
63 See Langbein, supra note 58, at 2046-47.
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C. Criticisms of the U.S. Rule
Those who prefer a more family-centered inheritance model criticize
the ability to disinherit descendants in the United States (except for
Louisiana). When Louisiana amended its forced heirship scheme to
exclude adult, non-disabled descendants, Katherine Shaw Spaht, a
professor at Louisiana State University, disapproved of the change:
[F]orced heirship, an institution tested through the ages,
remains a sound social policy to date because it helps preserve
and strengthen the family by reminding parents of their
societal responsibilities and by binding family members
together throughout life and beyond .... [Olther states are
now beginning to realize that the rampant disintegration of the
family is not unrelated to legal institutions that prompted a
selfish individualism by glorifying the unrestricted freedom of
testation.64
Others have made similar arguments concerning the disadvantages
of testamentary freedom. Vincent Rougeau, for example, associates
the abolition of forced heirship in Louisiana with "the weakening of
the bonds of kinship, love, and friendship in cultural life" and calls it
"a small part of a larger tale about an increasingly libertarian American
culture and the legal system that has grown out of it."65 Some writers
have focused on the natural connection between parent and child,
viewing disinheritance as unnatural.66 To these authors, unrestricted
testamentary freedom is almost immoral.
64 Spaht, supra note 10, at 57-58.
65 Vincent D. Rougeau, No Bonds But Those Freely Chosen: An Obituary for the
Principle of Forced Heirship in American Law, 1 Civ. L. COMMENT. (forthcoming Dec.
2008) (manuscript at 74, 76, on file with author).
66 See, e.g., CHESTER, supra note 10, at 81-82 ("The glue of the traditional family is
biological connection, sometimes supplemented by adoption. . . . American
'exceptionalism' is now too often exemplified by excessive regard for the
individualistic whims of parents to the possible detriment of their children."); Batts,
supra note 10, at 1197 ("As sacred and fundamental as the [parent-child] bond may be
... it is consistently abandoned whenever it clashes with another fundamental
concept imbedded in America's social and legal structure: testamentary freedom.").
The idea is centuries old, and was expressed eloquently by Locke. 1 JOHN LOCKE, Two
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, ch. 9, § 88 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge University Press
1988) (1689). A related point is that unequal division of estates "can poison the
reservoir of family joy that parents want to bequeath to the next generation,
resurrecting or exacerbating sibling rivalries, especially in blended families created
through divorce or remarriage after the death of a spouse." David Cay Johnston,
Learning to Share, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2008, at SPG 1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/10/business/businessspecial3/ 10FAMILY.html.
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Not surprisingly, some of these same commentators have proposed
alternatives to the U.S. rule, generally based on either the family
maintenance or forced heirship systems. Until recently, the principal
American champion of family maintenance has been Ronald Chester,
who favors the system currently in place in British Columbia,
Canada.67 Chester has argued that the British Columbia system is both
predictable and generally respectful of the testator's wishes,' and has
contended that the family maintenance system's flexibility is preferable
to the forced heirship regime.69 More recently, however, Chester has
acknowledged that problems in the U.S. probate system call into
question the viability of a family maintenance scheme in the U.S., and
he now seems to favor a forced-share approach.70
Deborah Batts, who was a law professor before becoming a federal
judge, has argued in favor of a slightly modified forced heirship
scheme. Batts's proposal, which she calls "protected inheritance,"
differs slightly from the regime of modern civil-law jurisdictions
because it gives preference to children who are dependent or
disabled.71 When there are surviving children of any age, Batts's
scheme would automatically set aside for the children one-half of their
intestate share of the estate, regardless of the terms of the will, and the
children's share would take precedence over that of any other devisee,
including the surviving spouse.72  Needs of dependent or disabled
children would take precedence, but adult, nondisabled children could
still receive a portion of the statutory fixed share.73 The children's
fixed share would be placed in a trust, together with a portion of the
surviving spouse's share (because the surviving spouse also has a duty
of support to the children), as well as any residue of the estate
(regardless of the devisee).74 Income from this trust would be payable
to the minor children until their education is complete, and then the
67 Chester, Children, supra note 10, at 449-53.
68 Id. at 449-50 ("[T]he norms that constrain judicial discretion are well known
and decisions seldom unduly surprise anyone.... Moreover, if litigation does ensue,
the judge will generally take the testator's testamentary wishes into account in
fashioning the final shares of the litigants.").
69 Id. But see Glendon, supra note 10, at 1186 (suggesting that "[miost of the
defects of the existing American family protection systems can be remedied without
introducing such a drastic change into a body of law that by and large functions well
on a day-to-day basis").
70 See CHESTER, supra note 10, at 89-92.
7' Batts, supra note 10, at 1253-58.
72 Id. at 1255.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 1256.
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corpus would be paid out according to the interests of the
contributing heirs. The children would then receive their share, the
surviving spouse's portion would be returned, and the residue would
be returned to the residuary beneficiaries.7" Batts's scheme would
include objective grounds for disinheritance of a child similar to those
in Louisiana, but would not allow disinheritance for subjective
reasons. 76
While Batts and Chester would protect even adult children from
disinheritance, Ralph Brashier would limit protection to minor
children. In a 1996 article, Brashier proposed, as an alternative to the
U.S. rule, a system that attempts to preserve the core of testamentary
freedom.77 Brashier suggests extending existing inter vivos child
support statutes to apply after death, so that minor children would be
entitled to support from their parent's estate.7 8  This alternative,
Brashier contends, poses less of a threat to the American ideal of
testamentary freedom.79 Moreover, it fills a hole in the current U.S.
regime by ensuring that parents do not leave minor children destitute
upon their deaths."0
With the possible exception of Brashier, who acknowledges the
importance of testamentary freedom to the American psyche,8 those
proposing changes to the U.S. rule in recent years have not discerned
any valid contemporary justification for a broad power to disinherit. 82
There are, of course, many arguments that proponents of testamentary
freedom have historically made, some of which will be discussed in
Part III of this Article. Advocates of reform, however, do not always
confront these arguments. Nor do they often consider whether
testamentary freedom might serve a useful purpose in modern society.
Rather, those proposing alternatives to the U.S. rule convey the
impression that the original reasons for the rule are no longer valid
today and that any new justifications do not merit discussion. These
authors contend we should instead concentrate our attention on
71 Id. at 1257.
76 Id. at 1260; see also LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 1621 (Supp. 2008); supra note 40
and accompanying text (providing 13 objective reasons for disinheritance).
17 Brashier, Protecting the Child, supra note 10, at 24-25.
78 Id.
71 See id. at 26 ("[T]he argument that an individual's right of testamentary
freedom outweighs his moral obligation to his minor children is absurd.")
80 See id. at 25.
81 See BRASHIER, supra note 10, at 109.
82 See, e.g., Batts, supra note 10, at 1243 (concluding that testamentary freedom
lacks compelling modem justification); Rougeau, supra note 65 (manuscript at 73, on
file with author) (same); Spaht, supra note 10, at 57-58 (same).
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developing an alternative regime that will protect the family ties so
easily broken by disinheritance.8 3
Parts III and IV discuss several possible contemporary justifications
for the U.S. rule, some of which have received more attention than
others. Before evaluating these justifications, however, we must first
determine why the U.S. rule developed as it did. Only by
understanding the rule's origins can we assess its continued relevance.
II. DISINHERITANCE AND THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW
To the extent that critics of the U.S. rule offer an explanation for its
existence, the explanation tends to involve a perceived American
tendency toward individualism.84 This account, however, cannot
explain the origins of the U.S. rule, because it was not invented in
America. Rather, like many American legal institutions, the rule was
imported here from England, where it was once a rule of the common
law. Although the continued survival of unlimited disinheritance in
the United States probably owes something to contemporary
individualism, or at least a commitment to private property rights and
the free market, the story of the doctrine begins in England. This Part
sketches the rough outlines of this story.
Ironically, the tale of inheritance in the common law begins not
with complete freedom of testation, but with the exact opposite -
primogeniture, a rule providing that all of a father's qualified land is
inherited automatically by his eldest son. Testamentary freedom in
England emerged in the shadow of primogeniture, and this fact is key
to understanding why an absolute power of disinheritance had already
developed in England by the time the American colonies were settled.
Disinheritance in the common law came into being as a byproduct of
reform, not as an independent policy.
83 For relevant proposals, see Batts, supra note 10, at 1269-70; Brashier, Protecting
the Child, supra note 10, at 24-25; and see also Rougeau, supra note 65 (manuscript at
72) (noting that "maximizing individual choice is not the only way to bring dignity to
a human life or to build a just society").
84 See, e.g., CHESTER, supra note 10, at 81-82 ("[Ulnrestrained individualism in the
United States is at war with the very concept of family .... The uniquely American
ability to disinherit one's children, even if they are minors or otherwise incapable,
exhibits, in part, an excessive need for control."); Rougeau, supra note 65 (manuscript
at 73) ("ITIhe concept of a permanent, communal identity grounded in social
institutions such as family groups is not a strong social current in American life.
American legal rules, economic conditions, political life, and social interactions reflect
this cultural reality by rewarding individual effort, achievement, and autonomy at the
expense of weaker community stakeholders like children, whose needs tend to
constrain individual freedom and choice.").
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A. England and the Common-Law Tradition
Primogeniture, or the right of. the firstborn son to succeed to his
father's land, was not a custom of Anglo-Saxon England. Rather
Norman conquerors introduced it to the kingdom.8" From the
perspective of the king, primogeniture considerably simplified the
problem of deciding whose homage to receive at the death of a tenant-
in-chief.86 At the end of the reign of Henry II (d. 1189), the principle
was limited to land held by knight-service or military tenure,87 but the
common law subsequently extended it to most free tenures. If one
or more sons survived the decedent, the eldest son would inherit the
land. Only if no son survived the decedent would the decedent's
daughters have a claim, and in that case they would all take as
coparceners.8 9 However, by the reign of Edward I (1272-1307), a rule
85 J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 267 (4th ed. 2002).
816 See Charles Donahue, Jr., What Causes Fundamental Legal Ideas? Marital
Property in England and France in the Thirteenth Century, 78 MICH. L. REV. 59, 81-82
(1979). For a modem economist's explanation of primogeniture, see C.Y. Cyrus Chu,
Primogeniture, 99 J. POL. ECON. 78, 97 (1991), who argues that "family heads prefer
the unequal bequest division policy so that at least one of their children is more likely
to stay (or become) rich, hence making their succession lines firm." Homage was the
ritual ceremony by which a tenant acknowledged his subservience to his lord. See 1
FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 296-98 (2d ed. 1968). So-called "tenants-in-chief"
held their land directly of the king and not through a mesne (intervening) lord. See
id. at 232-33.
87 BAKER, supra note 85, at 268; THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE
REALM OF ENGLAND COMMONLY CALLED GLANVILL, bk. VII, ch. 3, at 75 (G.D.G. Hall ed.,
1965) (treatise completed ca. 1187-89) [hereinafter GLANVILL]. Originally, holding
land by knight-service (military tenure) required the tenant to provide a certain
number of knights to the lord for military service, but this was commuted to a
monetary payment (scutage) within a century after the Norman Conquest. BAKER,
supra note 85, at 227-28. Tenure by knight-service differed from socage tenure, which
was always characterized by the payment of rent rather than military service. See 1
POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 86, at 293.
88 BAKER, supra note 85, at 268. Land in the county of Kent, which provided for
partible inheritance among male heirs, was an exception. See, e.g., N. Neilson, Custom
and the Common Law in Kent, 38 HARV. L. REV. 482, 487-90 (1925) (discussing
peculiarities of Kentish gavelkind tenure). Other boroughs of England also had
customs allowing freedom of testation prior to the Statute of Wills. For examples
from the Year Books, see Y.B. 39 Edw. 3, fols. 232b-33a, Lib. Ass., pl. 6 (1365)
(evaluating customs of Salisbury); and Y.B. 40 Edw. 3, fols. 246-47b, Lib. Ass., pl. 27
(1366) (discussing certain lands in Denham).
89 The term "coparceners" (participes) designated those who inherited in co-
ownership, especially sisters who inherited in default of a male heir. See KENELM
EDWARD DIGBY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 274
(1892); 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 86, at 272.
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had developed that if the eldest son predeceased the decedent leaving
children of his own, any younger sons of the decedent would not take;
rather the eldest son's children would take instead.9"
As far as the courts of common law were concerned, no father could
circumvent these rules through testamentary disposition, "for only God,
not man, can make an heir."'" The common law, in other words, did
not recognize testamentary freedom with respect to most freehold
land,92 and treated such land as passing by intestacy notwithstanding an
attempted testamentary disposition. In order to prevent the eldest son
from inheriting the land, the father had to convey it to a third party
before death, which could pose practical difficulties for the father.93
On the other hand, personal property was an entirely different
matter. It fell within the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts, which
recognized and encouraged the making of wills.94 Even with regard to
personal property, however, these courts imposed a limitation on
testamentary freedom in the form of the legitim, a custom derived
from Roman law that granted forced shares to the testator's surviving
90 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 86, at 262-63. This last rule evolved in
response to the famous casus regis, the king in question being John, who succeeded to
the throne notwithstanding the better claim of his nephew Arthur, son of Geoffrey,
the elder brother of John. See Joseph Biancalana, For Want of justice: Legal Reforms of
Henry II, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 507-08 (1988).
" The original Latin is solus Deus heredem facere potest, non homo. GLANVILL, supra
note 87, bk. VII, ch. 1, at 71.
92 In general, the early common law distinguished between different types of
tenure based on the free or villein (serf) status of the tenant. However, it was possible
for a freeman to hold land but owe villein services, thus complicating the line between
freehold land and land held in villeinage. See 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 86,
at 390-91. The distinction was important, however, in that the king's courts originally
protected the seisin only of those who held freehold land. See 2 id. at 35.
" An heir had a duty under the common law to warrant his ancestor's reasonable
grants. See Biancalana, supra note 90, at 493-94. Prior to the development of the use,
however, conveyance to a third party might mean a loss of lifetime enjoyment of the
land by the father, which could pose difficulties in an agrarian society. The
development of a market for land in the early 13th century may have made
disinheritance by inter vivos conveyances more feasible, however, by providing
monetary proceeds which the landlord could consume or dissipate before death. Cf.
Joseph Biancalana, The Origins and Early History of the Writs of Entry, 25 LAw & HIsT.
REV. 513, 548-51 (2007) (discussing how Henry Il's reforms facilitated development
of market for land). Land held in fee tail posed special problems. See JOSEPH
BIANCALANA, THE FEE TAIL AND THE COMMON RECOVERY IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 1176-
1502, at 98-121 (2001) (discussing development of writ of formedon in descender).
On the development of the use, which further facilitated disinheritance by inter vivos
transfers, see infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
94 BAKER, supra note 85, at 386-87.
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spouse (if any) and descendants.9 5 Unlike the common-law rules for
land, the ecclesiastical legitim seems to have treated sons and
daughters equally, and did not favor the eldest son over others.
Nevertheless, while an Englishman of the late thirteenth century
would have been able to devise between one-half and one-third of his
personal property to persons of his choosing, he would have had no
testamentary control over his remaining personal property or any land
he owned at death. Testamentary freedom, in other words, was the
exception rather than the rule, applied only to personal property, and
even then subject to limitations.
Despite its persistence in English law, the rule of primogeniture
appears to have been unpopular almost from the start; many
landowners wished to circumvent it. By the fourteenth century, some
of them were able to do so by taking advantage of the developing
concept of a "use." Although it was not possible to devise land by
will, a landowner could transfer the land to, or "enfeoff," a group of
friends or neighbors "to the use" (ad opus) of a certain named
individual, who was entitled to possession at the original landowner's
death. 6 Although the common law did not recognize this use, the
king's chancellor could nonetheless enforce it.9" Because the so-called
feoffees to uses - the third parties - had legal title to the property,
the beneficiary, or cestui que use, effectively disinherited the heir, and
could enforce his right to possession in Chancery.98 This innovation
proved so popular that by the beginning of the sixteenth century most
of the land in England was held in use.99
An additional benefit of the use concerned taxation rather than
testamentary freedom. When a tenant died seised - roughly, in
91 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 86, at 350-51. Under the evolved version of
the rule, a man who was survived by a wife or a child, but not both, would have
testamentary power over one-half of his personal property. Id. On the other hand, if
he were survived by both his wife and one or more children, his power would extend
only to one-third. Id. At least by 1215, daughters were also protected by the English
legitim. See id. at 350 n.4 ("It is fairly certain that by pueri both the charter and
Bracton mean, not sons, but children."). The defunct English custom is generally
spelled legitim, while the current Louisiana institution is spelled legitime. The two
institutions are distinct, although they share a common origin and are functionally
similar. See Foster, Linking Support, supra note 10, at 1210 n.47.
96 BAKER, supra note 85, at 248-50.
97 See R.H. Helmholz, The Early Enforcement of Uses, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1503,
1503 (1979).
98 Before the Chancellor began to intervene, feoffments to uses seem to have been
enforced by some English ecclesiastical courts. See id. at 1503-04.
99 BAKER, supra note 85, at 251.
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possession - of freehold land, °0 the lord was normally entitled to
certain "incidents," which were essentially feudal taxes. If the tenant
left an heir, he might be obligated to pay relief to enter into the
inheritance; and if the heir was underage, the lord would be entitled to
wardship, retaining possession of the land (and its profits) until the
heir came of age.' On the other hand, if the tenant enfeoffed the land
to feoffees to uses during his lifetime, these incidents would not attach
at his death. 10 2  Thus, the use allowed landowners not only to
circumvent the rule of primogeniture, but also to avoid feudal taxes.
Because most lords were also tenants, they gained as much as they lost
by this aspect of the use. But there was one lord who was not a
tenant - the king - and he did not like to be deprived of a valuable
source of revenue. In 1536, King Henry VIII prevailed upon
Parliament to remedy this problem by passing the Statute of Uses,
which "executed" all uses and thereby transferred legal title of all land
held in use from the feoffees to the beneficiaries.0 3
Although the Statute of Uses curbed the tax avoidance the use had
made possible, it did not remedy the inflexibility of the common law
rule of primogeniture. Landowners understood the need of the king
to collect taxes, but they were not pleased by the loss of testamentary
freedom that the use had made possible. Under pressure from these
landowners, therefore, Parliament enacted the Statute of Wills in
1540, which for the first time created a right to dispose of land by a
100 The term "seisin" in the common-law is difficult to define. Although some have
associated it with the Roman concept of possession, it also connoted the special bond
between lord and tenant, which was alien to Roman law. For different views on the
matter, see, for example, S.F.C. MILSOM, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ENGLISH FEUDALISM
39-40 (1976) (arguing that seisin must be understood in context of lord-vassal
relationship); DONALD W. SUTHERLAND, THE ASSIZE OF NOVEL DISSEISIN 41-42 (1973)
(describing seisin and right as "reference points in a continuum"); Joshua C. Tate,
Ownership and Possession in the Early Common Law, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 280, 3 12-13
(2006) (arguing that English seisin had some features in common with Roman
possession, but that two concepts were nonetheless distinct).
101 BAKER, supra note 85, at 238-41.
102 Id. at 252-53.
103 27 Hen. 8, c. 10 (1536) (Eng.); BAKER, supra note 85, at 255-56. On the origins
of the statute, see, for example, J.M.W. BEAN, THE DECLINE OF ENGLISH FEUDALISM
1215-1540, at 270-92 (1968), who attributes the king's success to "a series of extra-
parliamentary manoeuvres which ultimately gave him a victory over uses in the courts
of law and thus presented the Commons with a fait accompli"; 2 THE REPORTS OF SIR
JOHN SPELMAN 195-202 (J.H. Baker ed., The Selden Soc'y 1978), who sees the statute as
the outcome of a debate among counsel in the courts and readers in the inns of court;
and E.W. Ives, The Genesis of the Statute of Uses, 82 ENG. HIST. REV. 673, 694-95
(1967), who argues that King Henry was more responsible for the Statute than his
minister, Thomas Cromwell, despite popular sentiments against Cromwell at time.
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will that the common-law courts would recognize." 4 Although the
statute protected one-third of land held by knight-service for the
decedent's heir, a landowner was otherwise free to devise his land to
whomever he pleased. 10 5 By 1660, a subsequent statute eliminated the
requirement that one-third of land held by knight-service pass to the
heir, allowing testators to devise land by will without restriction.
0 6
While testamentary freedom for land came suddenly by statute,
testamentary freedom for personal property evolved more gradually as
the institution of legitim became obsolete. By the end of the fourteenth
century, the legitim was enforced only in the north of England and a few
places in the south."0 7 By the end of the seventeenth century, even
northern England no longer observed the custom.0 8 The passing of the
rule may partly reflect the difficulty of enforcing it (decedents could
evade it through inter vivos conveyance) and uncertainty among
scholars and practitioners of canon law as to the status of the
doctrine. °9 A growing sentiment in favor of testamentary freedom,
however, most likely played a role as well."0 Nonetheless, Parliament
did not enact a statute granting testamentary freedom for personal
property equivalent to the Statute of Wills for land.
For present purposes, the most significant fact about the rise of
testamentary freedom in England is that it emerged in the shadow of a
104 32 Hen. 8, c. 1 (1540) (Eng.); BAKER, supra note 85, at 256; BEAN, supra note
103, at 293-301. Part of the motivation for the Statute of Wills appears to have been a
fear that conveyancers would find means to avoid the Statute of Uses "by drawing a
feoffment to the use of the testator for life, with remainder to such persons as he
should by will appoint." BAKER, supra note 85, at 203. Because the ultimate policy
goal of the Henrician reforms was to raise royal revenue, the Statute of Wills has been
described as "a taxation statute that happened to create the right to devise a certain
portion of land." M.C. Mirow, Bastardy and the Statute of Wills: Interpreting a
Sixteenth-Century Statute with Cases and Readings, 69 MIss. LJ. 345, 347 (1999); see
also N.G. Jones, The Influence of Revenue Considerations Upon the Remedial Practice of
Chancery in Trust Cases, 1536-1660, in COMMUNITIES AND COURTS IN BRITAIN 1150-
1900, at 99, 99 (Christopher Brooks & Michael Lobban eds., 1997) (noting
significance of Statute of Wills as "the background to an assessment of the influence of
revenue considerations upon trust remedies in Chancery").
105 See A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 191-92 (2d ed. 1986). The
provision requiring one-third of land held by military service to pass to the heir was
meant to preserve the right of the king and other lords to the feudal incident of
wardship. See BEAN, supra note 103, at 293.
106 Tenures Abolition Act of 1660, 12 Car. 2, c. 24 (Eng.); see SIMPSON, supra note
105, at 198-99.
107 R.H. Helmholz, Legitim in English Legal History, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 659, 670.
108 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 86, at 355.
109 Helmholz, supra note 107, at 670-71.
110 Id. at 671.
University of California, Davis
rule that rewarded the eldest son with all the decedent's land, in a
society where land was the primary source of wealth and power. 1 '
The Statute of Wills, like the institution of the use, allowed a
landowner to spread his wealth more evenly among his descendants,
rather than transmit the entire estate to the eldest son. In other
words, a desire to provide for all descendants, rather than a desire to
disinherit them, may have played the dominant role in the rise of
testamentary freedom in the common law. Had the common law
treated younger children more fairly, there might have been more
resistance at the outset to the development of unlimited freedom of
testation. Parliament was not thinking about the possibility of
intentional and unwarranted disinheritance of children at the whim of
the testator because the problems at hand were tax avoidance and the
existence of compulsory primogeniture. While the disappearance of
the legitim for personal property in the ecclesiastical courts suggests
that opposition to primogeniture was not the only factor behind the
development of testamentary freedom in England, it certainly played a
role with regard to land.
B. Freedom of Testation in Early America
By the time of Blackstone, settled law in England did not impose any
obligations on a parent to devise property to descendants." 2 This was
also true in the British colonies that eventually became the United
States. Early American opinions sometimes state that an heir cannot
be disinherited "but by plain words," 113 precluding disinheritance by
implication through a rule of construction that served to protect some
heirs. There is no indication, however, of any resistance in the British
colonies in America to the basic English rule allowing disinheritance
"' "Throughout the Middle Ages, land was the central source of power in
England. It was the basis for wealth, for authority, for jurisdiction, and for military
strength." MARGARET McGLYNN, THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE AND THE LEARNING OF THE
INNS OF COURT 1 (2003).
112 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *502. Blackstone explains the common
practice of leaving each disinherited heir a shilling as deriving from the Roman
presumption that a testator who left a child nothing lacked mental capacity; however,
he states that this was not the law in England. Id. at *503.
113 Dill v. Dill, 1 S.C. Eq. (1 Des. Eq.) 237, *2 (1791); see also Wilder v. Goss, 14
Mass. (1 Tyng) 357, 359 (1817); Sprig v. Weems, 2 H. & McH. 266, *5 (Md. 1789).
This was a common rule in 19th-century America, and was usually provided by
statute, not being English in origin. Unlike forced heirship in the civil law, the rule
was meant to serve the presumed intent of the decedent. See Joseph W. McKnight,
Spanish Legitim in the United States: Its Survival and Decline, 44 AM.J. COMP. L. 75, 91-
92 (1996).
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of children. 14 On the other hand, by 1800, all American states had
abolished the rule of primogeniture, even for intestate distribution, on
the ground that the rule was incompatible with a republican form of
government. 1 5 Anglo-Americans seemed unaware of the restrictions
on testamentary freedom formerly imposed by the legitim." 6
By contrast, in areas that passed from the control of Spain or France
to the United States, particularly Louisiana, New Mexico, and Texas,
forced heirship survived for a time." 7  As increasing numbers of
Anglo-Americans from the East Coast settled in New Mexico and
Texas, however, opposition to forced heirship grew, leading to its
abolition in Texas in 1856 and in New Mexico in 1889.118 Only in
Louisiana, whose legal system retained many features of the civil law,
did forced heirship survive, and there only in a diluted form.119 Anglo-
Americans had become accustomed to personal freedom, and the
nineteenth century Western spirit of individualism did not tolerate the
restrictions that forced heirship imposed. 20
Because it occurred more recently, the rejection of forced heirship in
the former Spanish colonies of the United States is perhaps more
relevant to the debate over the current U.S. rule than the original
English history of that rule. Even so, much has changed about
American society since the nineteenth century, and the reasons for the
rejection of forced heirship in Texas and New Mexico - which may
have included suspicion of "foreign" legal customs - need not require
"1 See McKnight, supra note 113, at 77-78.
II See Claire Priest, Creating an American Property Law: Alienability and Its Limits
in American History, 120 HARV. L. REV. 385, 394-95, 441 n.249 (2006). This process
began in the colonial period in New England and Pennsylvania, which adopted
partible descent beginning in the 17th century, although the eldest son was often
given a double share. See George L. Haskins, The Beginnings of Partible Inheritance in
the American Colonies, 51 YALE LJ. 1280, 1280 (1942); Carole Shammas, English
Inheritance Law and Its Transfer to the Colonies, 31 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 145, 153-57
(1987). Thomas Jefferson, who viewed reform of the law of inheritance as an
important component of the creation of a republican society, spearheaded the
abolition of primogeniture (and entails) in Virginia. See Stanley N. Katz,
Republicanism and the Law of Inheritance in the American Revolutionary Era, 76 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 12-18 (1977); John V. Orth, After the Revolution: "Reform" of the Law of
Inheritance, 10 LAw & HIST. REV. 33, 33-36 (1992). On the other hand, primogeniture
in cases of intestacy was not abolished in England until 1925. See Administration of
Estates Act, 1925, 15 Geo. 5, c. 23, § 45 (Eng.).
16 See McKnight, supra note 113, at 78.
17 See id. at 81-85.
118 See id. at 92-98.
11 See id. at 98.
120 See id. at 107.
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its rejection today.1 21  Such an argument would come close to the
fallacy so famously rejected by Justice Holmes, who did not find mere
historical precedent a sufficient justification for current policy.122 The
next two Parts will explore whether there is a better reason for an
unlimited power to disinherit children than history alone.
Il. CONTEMPORARY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR TESTAMENTARY FREEDOM
If the historical development of unlimited disinheritance in the
common law does not necessarily justify its continued existence, many
other explanations can be offered that may carry more weight. These
include the positive incentives that freedom of testation may create; a
noted American tendency toward individualism; a shift to human
capital as the dominant form of inheritance; and obvious problems
with the U.S. probate system. All of these arguments must be
considered in evaluating whether unlimited disinheritance has some
justification besides its historical pedigree.
A. The Bequest Motive
One of the most prominent arguments in favor of freedom of
testation concerns the positive incentives that it may provide for the
donor. It is said that allowing each individual to decide how property
will be used after death encourages work and savings, thereby
maximizing total wealth. 123 This argument is not a new one; it appears
in the thirteenth century English legal treatise known as Bracton,124
121 According to Professor McKnight, Anglo-American settlers in the Southwest
rejected the "traditional Germanic tribal concept of familial right to property" adhered
to in Hispanic law. See id. at 106-07. With the recent popularity of perpetual
"dynasty trusts," however, the U.S. may ironically be moving back toward this rejected
concept of familial property. See Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach,
Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and
Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 410-12 (2005) (reporting substantial flow of money into
jurisdictions that allow perpetual dynasty trusts); Joshua C. Tate, Perpetual Trusts and
the Settlor's Intent, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 595, 617-20 (2005).
122 "It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it
was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind
imitation of the past." Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV.
457, 469 (1897).
123 Joshua C. Tate, Conditional Love: Incentive Trusts and the Inflexibility Problem,
41 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.J. 445, 480-82 (2006).
124 See 2 BRACTON ON THE LAwS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 181 (George E.
Woodbine & Samuel E. Thome eds. & trans., The Selden Soc'y 1968) (c. 1235)
[hereinafter BRACTON] ("[A] citizen could scarcely be found who would undertake a
[Vol. 42:129
20081 Caregiving and the Case for Testamentary Freedom 157
and was restated by various philosophers in subsequent centuries.
12
Eliminating freedom of testation, it is argued, would "discourage
individual initiative and thrift," because some individuals would have
less of an incentive to accumulate property if they could not choose
who would receive it after death. 126 Related to this argument is the
claim that frustrating testamentary intent would lead to the depletion
of resources, as property owners might focus solely on present needs
to the exclusion of long-term conservation interests.
127
Some critics oppose the notion that freedom of testation leads
individuals to work harder and save more. As noted by Adam Hirsch
and William Wang, individuals may strive to accumulate wealth
beyond the needs of lifetime consumption for a variety of reasons
unrelated to the power of testation. 128 In many cases, persons may
accumulate wealth "to gratify their egos, to gain prestige, to gain
power - and simply out of habit. Once these impulses are taken into
account, the economic contributions traceable to freedom of testation
could turn out to be small."'129 It is even less clear that the power to
disinherit one's children, as opposed to freedom of testation generally,
great enterprise in his lifetime if, at his death, he was compelled against his will to
leave his estate to ignorant and extravagant children and undeserving wives."). The
treatise probably was not written (as once thought) by the royal judge Henry de
Bracton, although he may have been responsible for certain revisions. See Paul Brand,
The Age of Bracton, 89 PROC. OF THE BRIT. ACAD. 65, 66-73 (1996) (arguing that treatise
was written in mid to late 1230s); Morris S. Arnold, Book Review, 91 HARV. L. REV.
517, 519 (1977) (discussing findings of Samuel Thorne). But see J.L. Barton, The
Mystery of Bracton, 14J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 1-142 (1993) (defending traditional view).
125 See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, Principles of the Civil Code, in 1 THE WORKS OFJEREMY
BENTHAM 297, 338 (1843) (suggesting that individuals would become spendthrifts,
purchase annuities, or spend all their money during life if they could not devise it by
will); 1 FRANCIS HUTCHESON, A SYSTEM OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1755) (arguing that
"industry should be much discouraged" if right of testation were eliminated); HENRY
SIDGWICK, THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICS 53 (Kraus Reprint Co. 1969) (4th ed. 1919)
(stating that "the abrogation of the power of bequest would remove from [the
individual] an important inducement to the exercise of industry and thrift in
advancing years").
126 See THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 34 (2d ed. 1953).
127 ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 158 (4th ed. 2004).
128 See Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead
Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 8 (1992); see also A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 718-19
(1938) (suggesting that transfer taxes "should impose a relatively small check upon
the creation of capital" because individuals have other reasons to accumulate wealth
besides desire to direct its disposition after death).
129 Hirsch & Wang, supra note 128, at 8-9.
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has much of an effect on the work and saving habits of typical
Americans. 130
In recent decades, several economists have debated the extent to
which a "bequest motive" - the desire to leave something behind
after death - plays an important role in the accumulation of wealth.
Those who adhere to the so-called "life-cycle" hypothesis, prevalent
since the 1950s, assume that the average individual "neither expects to
receive nor desires to leave any inheritance." 131 Laurence Kotlikoff
and Lawrence Summers challenged this assumption, arguing that "the
pure life-cycle component of aggregate U.S. savings is very small" and
that "American capital accumulation results primarily from
intergenerational transfers.' ' 132 Although some studies following that
of Kotlikoff and Summers challenged their findings, more recent
research seems to support a significant bequest motive, at least among
some segments of the population. 133  The conflicting studies might
partially be reconciled by concluding that, while people primarily
accumulate wealth to guard against future contingencies during life,
the desire to bequeath wealth to future generations does play a
secondary role.'34 This conclusion, however, does not provide much
130 This is because 'intentional disinheritance of children appears to be the
exception rather than the rule. See Edward C. Norton & Donald H. Taylor, Equal
Division of Estates and the Exchange Motive, 17 J. AGING & Soc. POL'Y 63, 74 (2005);
infra note 233 and accompanying text.
131 Albert Ando & Franco Modigliani, The "Life Cycle" Hypothesis of Saving:
Aggregate Implications and Tests, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 55, 56 (1963).
132 Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Lawrence H. Summers, The Role of Intergenerational
Transfers in Aggregate Capital Accumulation, 89 J. POL. ECON. 706, 707 (1981).
133 Compare Michael D. Hurd, Savings of the Elderly and Desired Bequests, 77 AM.
ECON. REV. 298, 306 (1987) (finding "no evidence for a bequest motive"), and Franco
Modigliani, The Role of Intergenerational Transfers and Life Cycle Saving in the
Accumulation of Wealth, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 15, 37-38 (1988) ("A certain amount of
evidence suggests that the pure bequest motive - the accumulation of wealth entirely
for the purpose of being distributed to heirs and not . . . for own consumption -
affects a rather small number of households, mostly located in the highest income and
wealth brackets."), with B. Douglas Bernheim, How Strong Are Bequest Motives?
Evidence Based on Estimates of the Demand for Life Insurance and Annuities, 99 J. POL.
ECON. 899, 924 (1991) (finding "powerful bequest motives for a large segment of the
population"), and William G. Gale & John Karl Scholz, Intergenerational Transfers and
the Accumulation of Wealth, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 145, 156 (1994) (suggesting that
bequests and inter vivos transfers account for "at least 51 percent of net worth
accumulation"). The most recent study, based on the AHEAD survey of elderly
Americans, suggests that roughly three-fourths of the population has a bequest
motive. Wojciech Kopczuk & Joseph P. Lupton, To Leave or Not to Leave: The
Distribution of Bequest Motives, 74 REV. ECON. STUD. 207, 230 (2007).
134 See Karen E. Dynan et al., The Importance of Bequests and Life-Cycle Saving in
Capital Accumulation: A New Answer, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 274, 277 (2002) (suggesting
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support for the possibility of unlimited disinheritance, because the
bequest motive may be more or less coextensive with a desire to
provide in general terms for one's descendants. 135  A testator whose
goal is simply to offer support for that person's descendants might not
object to a forced heirship or family maintenance scheme. The
advantage of the U.S. rule is that it allows the testator to treat
descendants unequally, and the debate over the life-cycle hypothesis
does not explain why a testator might want to do this.
B. American Individualism
If the possible incentives for work and savings do not fully justify
the U.S. rule, many other arguments can be made on its behalf. One
argument is that the rule simply reflects an undeniable tendency
toward individualism in American society, and legal rules must
operate within a societal framework. 3 6  Because individualism is
deeply embedded in the American psyche, the argument goes, the law
of inheritance should respect the rights of individuals with respect to
their property, even to the point of allowing disinheritance of
descendants. 
137
Americans have a long tradition of resisting restraints on personal
freedom. Anti-tax rhetoric, for example, although found in many
countries, has a uniquely patriotic aspect in the United States dating
back to the revolutionary period. 138 Contemporary arguments in favor
of an individualist interpretation of the Second Amendment also
highlight the perceived connection between individualism and
patriotism in the United States. 39  American property law is
committed, at least in theory, to a broad right to exclude others.
140
that "if the bequest motive suddenly disappeared because of a confiscatory estate and
gift tax, saving behavior would likely change only modestly for all but the very
wealthy").
135 But see Kopczuk & Lupton, supra note 133, at 230-31 (finding that "a
significant number of households without children report a desire to leave a
bequest").
136 See, e.g., Oldham, supra note 10, at 273-74 (quoting Louisiana legislator who
allegedly justified abolition of legitime on basis that "this is my money, I made it and I
can do what I want with it").
137 See id.
138 See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Legitimacy and the Right of Revolution: The Role of
Tax Protests and Anti-Tax Rhetoric in America, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 819, 820-28 (2002).
139 See generally H. Richard Uviller & William G. Merkel, The Second Amendment in
Context: The Case of the Vanishing Predicate, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 403, 406-07 (2000).
140 See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)
(holding minor but permanent physical occupation of owner's property constitutes
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However limited this is in practice, it nonetheless plays an important
role in the American understanding of ownership. The U.S. rule
allowing disinheritance of descendants extends this concept of
absolute ownership beyond the grave, favoring the right of the
individual owner over familial responsibilities.
Although the individualism argument no doubt helps to explain the
persistence of the U.S. rule, its application is less clear with regard to
another aspect of the American law of inheritance, namely, the
protections accorded to the surviving spouse. With the exception of
Georgia, every American state limits the ability of a testator to
disinherit a surviving spouse. States accomplish this either through a
statutory "elective share" of the testator's property or by classifying
both spouse's earnings as community property, one-half of which
belongs automatically to the surviving spouse.141 The elective share,
which is used in common-law or separate-property states, typically
protects a certain percentage of the property for the surviving spouse,
who can elect to take that property notwithstanding the decedent
spouse's will.142 By contrast, in community-property states, property
acquired during the marriage other than by gift, devise, or inheritance
(or by exchanging property acquired before marriage) generally
"taking" for Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment purposes); Jacque v. Steenberg Homes,
Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997) (finding landowners entitled to punitive damages
for trespass that resulted in no actual damage to their property).
141 See Terry L. Turnipseed, Why Shouldn't I Be Allowed to Leave My Property to
Whomever I Choose at Death? (or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Start Loving the
French), 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 737, 739-40 (2006). For discussion of Georgia's unusual
lack of spousal protection, compare Verner F. Chaffin, A Reappraisal of the Wealth
Transmission Process: The Surviving Spouse, Year's Support and Intestate Succession, 10
GA. L. REV. 447, 463-70 (1976), who defends the lack of elective share, with Peter H.
Strott, Note, Preventing Spousal Disinheritance in Georgia, 19 GA. L. REV. 427, 427-28
(1985), who argues that Georgia should enact an elective share statute. Elective share
statutes exist only in separate-property states, as a replacement for the spousal
protection that is provided in those states that classify property acquired during the
marriage through the labor of either spouse as community property. See Langbein &
Waggoner, supra note 34, at 306.
142 There is substantial variation among elective share statutes, but a common
provision guarantees one-third of the decedent's estate for the surviving spouse if the
decedent left surviving issue, or one-half if the decedent left no surviving issue. See
Turnipseed, supra note 141, at 739. The 1990 Uniform Probate Code applies the
elective share to the "augmented estate," which includes certain nonprobate transfers
by the decedent and awards the surviving spouse a percentage of the property that
varies from three to fifty percent of the augmented estate depending on the length of
the marriage. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-202 to -213 (1990). The recapture scheme of
the UPC was preceded by earlier rules such as the "illusory transfer" doctrine, through
which courts attempted to prevent evasion of elective share statutes through inter
vivos transfers. See Newman v. Dore, 9 N.E.2d 966, 968-69 (N.Y. 1937).
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belongs to the married couple as a community, in which case one-half
of the undivided property belongs to each spouse.143 Thus, under
either the elective share or community-property law, neither spouse
can completely disinherit the surviving spouse if either spouse has
acquired property through labor during the marriage. Testamentary
freedom is unlimited only with respect to the unprotected portion of
the marital estate. Civil-law forced share systems differ from the U.S.
regime in how they define the class of protected persons, not in their
recognition of a protected share.144
It is possible to avoid many elective-share statutes by inter vivos
transfers.14  This technique, however, has its limits, as will be
discussed shortly.146 Elective-share statutes pose a significant
limitation on. testamentary freedom, preventing complete
disinheritance of spouses. When it comes to the rights of spouses,
U.S. law imposes significant limitations on the right to dispose of one's
property as one sees fit. It is not difficult to see why the law treats
spouses differently than descendants: spouses may be perceived as
contributing to the accumulation of family property and thus having a
stronger claim upon it. 14 7  Moreover, U.S. law does not recognize
plural marriage, but tolerates unlimited procreation: each adult can
legally have many children, but only one spouse at a time. And it is
possible to divorce one's spouse, but not one's child. Nevertheless,
spousal protection suggests that individualism is not the sole driving
force in American inheritance law.
143 See BRASHIER, supra note 10, at 11-12, 21-23.
144 See supra text accompanying notes 34-37.
145 See Turnipseed, supra note 141, at 739-40, 786 (explaining how, even if statute
has recapture provision similar to 1990 UPC, spouse can still avoid statute through
offshore inter vivos trusts as well as domestic irrevocable life insurance trusts, gifts made
more than two years before death, joint purchases of property with non-spouse, and
annual exclusion gifts). It may also be possible to evade the elective share by purchasing
U.S. Treasury bills. See LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 10-24 (4th ed. 2006). Changing
one's domicile to a jurisdiction that does not have an elective share is the "most certain
alternative for a client who wants to minimize the entitlement of a surviving spouse."
Jeffrey N. Pennell, Minimizing the Surviving Spouse's Elective Share, in 32 U. MIAMI INST.
ON EST. PLAN. 91 904.3(C), at 9-35 (1998). As Professor Pennell points out, there may be
legitimate reasons for a client to minimize the spouse's elective share in some
circumstances. Id. 91 906, at 9-52 to -53. Turnipseed argues that states should either
abolish the elective share, and allow disinheritance of spouses, or adopt a community-
property system. See Turnipseed, supra note 141, at 793-94.
146 See infra text accompanying note 187.
147 See WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN,JR. & SHELDON F. KURTZ, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES
§ 3.1, at 122-23 (3d ed. 2004).
University of California, Davis
In general, the centrality of individualism as the defining American
trait is debatable. 148  Although ownership of property carries with it
certain rights in U.S. law, it also entails certain obligations. 4 9 In the
family law context, this is particularly evident in the imposition on
parents of a duty to support their children. Every state has some
mechanism for collecting child support from noncustodial parents of a
minor child.15 Most states require parents to support a disabled adult
child, at least if the disability arose before the child reached the age of
majority.'' Similarly, federal law gives priority to support claims over
all other debts in the event of bankruptcy.12 Such rules impose a
significant restraint on the notion that ownership of property entails
an absolute right to exclude others. Although U.S. law continues to
protect the rights of parents in various contexts, 5 3 it also recognizes
that parents have a basic duty to provide for their children, at least
until they reach the age of majority. 54
148 See, e.g., BARRY ALAN SHAIN, THE MYTH OF AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM: THE
PROTESTANT ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1996) (arguing that 18th-
century American political thought had significant communitarian strain).
149 For example, although the law generally allows an owner to destroy property,
courts will often ignore a request to destroy property after the owner dies. See Lior
Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 783-87 (2005) (criticizing
this trend). Even during the owner's lifetime, there are significant limitations on the
right to exclude others from one's property. See Joseph William Singer, The Reliance
Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 675-77 (1988) (discussing cases where non-
owners are allowed access to land to prevent serious harm to themselves or others, or
when owner has previously opened up his or her property to others).
0 This is required by federal law. See 42 U.S.C. § 667 (2000); see alsoJo Michelle
Beld & Len Biernat, Federal Intent for State Child Support Guidelines: Income Shares,
Cost Shares, and the Realities of Shared Parenting, 37 FAM. L.Q. 165, 165 (2003)
(discussing interaction of state and federal requirements).
. See Sandie L. Buhai, Parental Support of Adult Children with Disabilities, 91 MINN.
L. REV. 710, 723-36 (2007). On the other hand, a majority of states also have statutes
requiring adult children to support parents who become indigent, although these
statutes may not be frequently enforced. See Seymour Moskowitz, Adult Children and
Indigent Parents: Intergenerational Responsibilities in International Perspective, 86 MARQ. L.
REV. 401, 422-28 (2002); Seymour Moskowitz, Filial Responsibility Statutes: Legal and
Policy Considerations, 9J.L. & POL'Y 709, 713-17 (2001).
152 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2006). For an argument that this provision does not go far
enough, see Brian W. Leach, The Unfinished Business of Bankruptcy Reform: A Proposal
to Improve the Treatment of Support Creditors, 115 YALE L.J. 247, 247-49 (2005).
' See Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 851-53
(2004) (pointing to right of parents to discipline their children and parental immunity
from liability for torts committed against their children as examples).
15' This parental duty, of course, is not new; it has long justified the parental rights
of custody and control. The duty, however, tends to be enforced by the courts only
when the parent utterly fails to discharge it, as in the case of child abuse or neglect.
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In short, while individualism is most likely a factor in the U.S. law
of inheritance, it cannot serve as a complete justification for a rule
allowing total disinheritance of descendants, given the limitations on
individual freedom that U.S. law does impose. Moreover, the
alternatives to the U.S. regime are not entirely inconsistent with an
individualist philosophy. European forced-heirship regimes do give
testators freedom of disposition over some portion of their property.
By the same token, the adoption of a family maintenance system
would not necessarily require courts to ignore the wishes of the
decedent entirely. In order to justify the U.S. rule, we must explain
why the law grants owners an unrestricted right to dispose of their
property in one context but denies or significantly limits that right in
other contexts.
C. Inheritance and Human Capital
One possible contemporary justification for the U.S. rule that does
not depend on American individualism is the change in the nature of
wealth transmitted from parent to child. In a classic article published
in 1988, John Langbein argued that the nature of wealth transmission
changed dramatically over the course of the twentieth century.155 In
the nineteenth century, Langbein argued, wealth transmitted from
parent to child typically took the form of the family farm or firm.
During the twentieth century, however, this form of wealth was
gradually supplanted by human capital - the investment of the
parents in the skills of the child. Consequently, "the business of
educating children [became] the main occasion for intergenerational
wealth transfer."'5 6 At the same time, increasing life expectancy meant
that parents needed to consume more of their assets during
retirement, leaving children with less of an expectation that they
would inherit property from their parents at death.5 7 Langbein
predicted that wealth transfer at death would continue to decline in
importance, at least with respect to the middle classes, while
educational expenditures would become more prominent. 158
See Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of
Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385, 395-96 (2008).
"' See John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth
Transmission, 86 MICH. L. REV. 722, 722-24 (1988).
156 Id. at 723.
'57 Id. at 740-43.
1s8 Id. at 750-51. Langbein's prediction that transfer at death would decline in
importance was based on the then-current predominance of annuitized "defined-
benefit" pension plans, which have greatly declined in importance in the last 20 years.
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Although this transformation in the nature of family wealth
transmission cannot explain why an absolute right to disinherit
descendants became embedded in U.S. law, it helps to justify the
continued existence of that rule. As increases in college tuition continue
to outpace inflation,5 9 the amount of money parents invest in their
children's education could also increase, and this lifetime investment may
satisfy any moral obligation parents might have to provide for their adult
children. According to this view, when the parents adequately provided
for a child during their lifetime by an investment in the child's skills, that
child has no reason to complain if the parents choose to devise what little
remains at death to someone else. 160
The fact that human capital has become the dominant mode of
family wealth transmission goes a long way toward justifying the U.S.
rule allowing disinheritance of descendants. Taken to its logical
extreme, however, it might call into question a central principle of the
law of intestate succession in every American state, namely, the rule
that parents of the intestate do not take when the intestate is survived
by descendants. 1 ' If children are adequately provided for through the
human capital transferred to them by their parents, one would expect
the law of intestacy to favor an elderly parent of the intestate over an
adult child, but this is not the case. The apparent assumption is that
the typical decedent would prefer for her children to inherit even if
they are adults and the decedent is also survived by her own parent.'62
If this assumption is incorrect, we should rethink not only the rules
See Internal Revenue Service, Choosing a Retirement Plan: Defined Benefits Plan,
http://www.irs.gov/retirement/article/O,,id=108950,00.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2008)
(citing statistics from Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation).
159 See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., PAYING FOR COLLEGE
9-12 (2004), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2004/2004075.pdf.
160 Cf. Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69, 90 (1990)
(proposing "a system that allows (or even encourages) parents to use their material
advantages to benefit their children through acculturation and education yet prohibits
transfers of purely financial advantage").
161 For examples of U.S. statutes favoring descendants over parents on intestacy,
see CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402(a) (West 1991); N.Y. EST. POwERs & TRUSTS LAw § 4-1.1
(McKinney 1998); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2103 (2005); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 38(a)(1)
(Vernon 2003); and UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-103(1), (2) (1990). This preference is
the rule in all U.S. jurisdictions. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.3 cmt. b (2003); DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 30, at 62.
162 A traditional policy goal of an intestacy statute is to give effect to the presumed
intent of an average property owner, although there are also other concerns, such as
providing for dependents, ensuring fairness, and promoting the interests of society.
See Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of Its
Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1033-37 (2004).
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regarding disinheritance of children, but also the shares children take
when the parent dies intestate.
The human capital justification for disinheritance is related to a
broader argument, namely, that inheritance of any sort exacerbates the
gap between rich and poor and increases concentration of wealth in
the hands of a few. Mark Ascher has suggested that the government
should reverse the default rule in favor of freedom of testation and
allow inheritance by healthy adult descendants only in limited
circumstances. 16 3 According to Ascher, "[c]hildren lucky enough to
have been raised, acculturated, and educated by wealthy parents need
not be allowed the additional good fortune of inheriting their parents'
property." 164 This is an important argument in light of the widening
gap between the very wealthy and the rest of the world's population. 165
One may find further support for Ascher's position in studies
suggesting that individuals who inherit large sums of money are more
likely to leave the labor force.'6 6 If inheritance by wealthy children is,
in general, bad for society, why should we impose any restrictions on
disinheritance?
This question is not easily answered. A rebuttal may depend, in
part, on the fact that despite the U.S. rule tolerating intentional
163 Ascher, supra note 160, at 72-76 (proposing that inheritance by healthy adult
descendants be allowed only for "a moderate amount of property" under "[a]
universal exemption").
164 Id. at 74. Warren Buffett has described such children as being members of the
"lucky sperm club" or having won the "ovarian lottery." See Rachel Breitman & Del
Jones, Should Kids Be Left Fortunes, or Be Left Out? Buffett's Donation Reignites the
Debate, USA TODAY, July 26, 2006, at IB, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/money/2006-07-25-heirs-usatx.htm.
165 See Robert Frank, The Wealth Report: Global Wealth Gap Widens, WALL ST. J.
ONLINE, Oct. 3, 2007, http://blogs.wsj.com/wealth/2007/10/03/global-wealth-gap-
widens/ (citing Boston Consulting Group study).
,66 See Douglas Holtz-Eakin et al., The Carnegie Conjecture: Some Empirical
Evidence, 108 Q.J. ECON. 413, 432-33 (1993) (finding that those who received larger
inheritances were "more likely to reduce their labor force participation to zero" than
those who received smaller inheritances, and "high inheritance families experienced
lower earnings growth than low inheritance families, which is consistent with the
notion that inheritance reduces hours of work"); cf. Guido W. Imbens et al.,
Estimating the Effect of Unearned Income on Labor Earnings, Savings, and Consumption:
Evidence from a Survey of Lottery Players, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 778 (2001) (finding
average reduction in labor earnings and increased consumption of leisure among
individuals who win lottery). But see DARIEN BERKOWITZ & JACOB MIKOW, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., BEYOND ANDREW CARNEGIE: USING A LINKED SAMPLE OF FEDERAL INCOME
AND ESTATE TAX RETURNS TO EXAMINE THE EFFECTS OF BEQUESTS ON BENEFICIARY
BEHAVIOR 5 (2000), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soilestincli.pdf (finding
that beneficiaries who started out in labor force tended to remain in it even after
receiving bequest).
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disinheritance, there is little political support in the United States for
abolishing testamentary bequests to children, even if they are healthy
adults.'67 If society is to tolerate inheritance by healthy adult children,
then, it may be preferable as a policy matter for the inheritance to be
divided more evenly among such children than to allow a testator to
concentrate wealth in the hands of a single heir, depending on the
nature of the assets in question.'68 It might be possible to design a
forced-heirship scheme that would allow a testator to leave an
unlimited amount of money or property to charitable organizations,
but would require that any bequest to descendants be divided more or
less evenly among them (or in accordance with a statutory
representation scheme). 169 Over time, if the law requires estates to be
divided among a large number of beneficiaries, wealth will be less
concentrated in the hands of a few.'70 Thus, in a system that
acknowledges freedom of testation as a baseline rule, a limited forced-
heirship scheme could actually reduce inequalities of wealth in the
long run.
D. The U.S. Probate System
Apart from philosophical and socioeconomic arguments, one can
deduce certain practical reasons for the U.S. rule allowing
disinheritance of descendants. As noted by Langbein, there are
significant problems with the probate bench in the United States.171
Connecticut, for example, allows individuals to serve as probate
judges who either lack formal legal training or who continue to
167 Cf. Adam J. Hirsch, American History of Inheritance Law, in OXFORD
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL HISTORY (Stanley N. Katz ed., forthcoming
Spring 2009) (manuscript at 23), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract7id=982428 (noting that "the United States stands out as a country peculiarly
deferential to the wishes of the dead").
168 For an argument that testators should be prohibited from leaving too much to
any particular heir, see Irving Kristol, Taxes, Poverty, and Equality, PUB. INT., Fall
1974, at 3, 26-28, as reprinted in DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 30, at 16-17. Similar
arguments were made against the institution of primogeniture in the late 18th
century. See sources cited supra note 115.
169 For an intestate representation scheme that treats descendants equally at each
generation, see UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-106 (1990). A similar scheme could be
incorporated into a forced-heirship statute, but applied only to the portion of the
estate that is not devised to charity or to the surviving spouse.
170 See Kristol, supra note 168, at 27.
171 Langbein, supra note 58, at 2044-45 (citing NORMAN F. DACEY, How To AVOID
PROBATE 1-7 (5th ed. 1993)).
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practice law part-time during their tenure as judges.17 2  In some
jurisdictions, probate and other state judges are elected by the
populace in elections that may not be entirely free from political
partisanship. 7 3 Moreover, in many states, parties in will contests have
a right to demand trial by jury, in which case a group of ordinary
individuals with no expertise in probate matters will be called upon to
decide the matter. 174 One study of will contests found that juries are
more likely than courts to rule in favor of the will contestant, 75 which
calls into question the impartiality of the jury as a dispute resolution
mechanism. 1
76
These shortcomings of the U.S. probate system may explain why
academic arguments in favor of adopting a family maintenance system
in the United States have not resulted in any significant legislative
reform. Family maintenance may be accepted in Commonwealth
jurisdictions partly because those jurisdictions have a more or less
uniformly competent and meritocratically selected bench. 177 However,
for Americans who believe in testamentary freedom, giving too much
discretion to judges and juries to interfere with a testator's estate plan
172 The Scandal of Connecticut's Probate Courts, Conn. Joint Standing Comm.,
Interim Hearing on Probate Court Systems, Program Review and Investigations, Pt. 2,
2005 (statement of John H. Langbein, Sterling Professor of Law and Legal History,
Yale Law School), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/faculty/1766.htm.
113 See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. 5, § 30 (requiring that criminal district and county-
wide judges be elected to four-year terms); Dozens of Judges Lose Seats in Democratic
Tidal Wave, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 8, 2006, at 15A (reporting election in which
Democratic candidates obtained 41 out of 42 contested judgeships, unseating several
long-serving veterans on bench). The role of political ideology in judicial
decisionmaking is a question that has received much attention in recent literature. See
Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831,
836-41 (2008).
114 See Josef Athanas, Comment, The Pros and Cons of Jury Trials in Will Contests,
1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 529, 536-40.
175 See Ronald Chester, Less Law, but More Justice? Jury Trials and Mediation as
Means of Resolving Will Contests, 37 DUQ. L. REV. 173, 178-81 (1999) (reporting that,
in survey of will contests reported nationwide over one-year period, will contestants
prevailed before judges 5 out of 22 times, but prevailed 6 out of 8 times before juries).
176 Chester, on the other hand, argues that jury trial is preferable to bench trial
precisely because juries are more sympathetic to disinherited children, although he
would favor mediation as a third alternative. See id. at 176-77.
177 Cf Langbein, supra note 58, at 2044 ("Americans can only look with envy to
the esteemed and meritocratic chancery bench that conducts probate adjudication in
English and Commonwealth jurisdictions."). Even in family maintenance systems,
however, there seems to be some resistance among attorneys to the broad discretion
given to courts. See 1 SCHOENBLUM, supra note 9, § 13.01[B], at 13-10 to -12
(discussing English example).
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is a somewhat frightening prospect."' The testator, it is assumed, is in
a better position to decide how the estate should be divided than an
elected judge or lay jurors, who may be more sympathetic to the pleas
of disinherited heirs.1 79  As a practical matter, therefore, a family
maintenance system is unlikely to be enacted in any U.S. jurisdiction
in the foreseeable future.
Nevertheless, although family maintenance may be precluded as a
viable option in the United States, a forced-heirship regime similar to
that in Continental Europe would not pose the same problem of
discretion. A statute could guarantee a fixed share to a testator's
descendants without giving much discretion to the finder of fact. As
discussed above, Louisiana followed this approach for all children
until 1995 and continues to do so for disabled children and those
under age twenty-four. 8 ° Moreover, the elective share that exists in
almost all U.S. common-law jurisdictions operates the same way,
without granting undue discretion to courts and juries.18" '
On the other hand, although a forced-heirship regime does not raise
the same problems of discretion as family maintenance, both schemes
share another practical objection, namely, the possibility of evasion
through inter vivos transfers. A testator who does not wish his
descendants to inherit at death can simply give the property away to
others during life. Unless something is done to recapture the inter
vivos transfers, the descendants can be effectively disinherited of most,
if not all, of the estate. As discussed above, this may have been one of
the reasons for the disappearance of the legitim in English law by the
seventeenth century; if the testator can simply give the property away
during life, the descendants will have nothing to claim at the testator's
death.'82
Once again, the common-law elective share for spouses offers a
helpful comparison. Early elective share statutes applied only to
property owned by the decedent at death, and thus inter vivos evasion
was relatively simple.8 3 In response, state courts began extending the
178 See Glendon, supra note 10, at 1188-89 (predicting that adoption of family
maintenance scheme would lead to frequent advertisements encouraging disappointed
heirs to bring claims under statute).
179 Cf. Langbein, supra note 58, at 2044 (arguing that "the integrity and ability of
the American probate bench has so often been found wanting that confidence in the
predictability and correctness of adjudication in these courts has been impaired").
180 See supra text accompanying notes 38-41.
181 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
182 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
183 See BRASHIER, supra note 10, at 17-19.
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application of the statutes to cover certain inter vivos transfers and
including these as part of the testator's estate for purposes of
calculating the elective share. 184  The 1969 Uniform Probate Code
("UPC") introduced the concept of the "augmented estate," which
added certain inter vivos transfers to the probate estate and
determined the elective share from the balance.'85 The 1990 UPC
retained the concept of the augmented estate, but expanded it to
include additional transfers made by the decedent.18 These changes
made it more difficult for spouses to avoid the elective share through
inter vivos transfers.
Despite the changes made by the UPC, it is still possible to avoid the
elective share through certain techniques, including the creation of a
trust in a jurisdiction that does not recognize the surviving spouse's
elective share.'87 Any forced share for descendants could be avoided
through similar means.'88 This, however, has not deterred the various
184 See, e.g., Sullivan v. Burkin, 460 N.E.2d 572, 577 (Mass. 1984) (treating "assets
of an inter vivos trust created during the marriage by the deceased spouse over which
he or she alone had a general power of appointment" as part of testator's estate for
purposes of elective share).
185 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (1969).
186 Id. §§ 2-204 to -207 (1990). The purpose of these changes was to bring the
elective share into line with the partnership theory of marriage. See Lawrence W.
Waggoner, Spousal Rights in Our Multiple-Marriage Society: The Revised Uniform
Probate Code, 26 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 683, 724 (1992); see also AM. LAW INST.,
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 4.09 cmt. c (2002) (explaining
partnership theory of marriage, which is based on idea that both spouses contribute
equally to entire marital relationship). But cf. Laura A. Rosenbury, Two Ways to End a
Marriage: Divorce or Death, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1227, 1282-89 (criticizing partnership
theory of marriage as reinforcing traditional gender roles). For proposals to reform
the elective share even further, see, for example, Alan Newman, Incorporating the
Partnership Theory of Marriage into Elective-Share Law: The Approximation System of
the Uniform Probate Code and the Deferred Community-Property Alternative, 49 EMORY
LJ. 487, 524 (2000), who proposes "a value deferred-community-property elective-
share system," and Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform Probate Code's Elective Share:
Time for a Reassessment, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 9 (2003), who suggests various
changes to "make the system more transparent and therefore more understandable."
187 See Turnipseed, supra note 141, at 783-87. Due to variance among American
states in the treatment and recognition of an elective share, creating an offshore trust
may not be necessary to accomplish this objective. See 1 SCHOENBLUM, supra note 9, §
10.18, at 10-50. Some jurisdictions allow evasion simply by using a revocable living
trust. See, e.g., Susan N. Gary, The Oregon Elective Share Statute: Is Reform an
Impossible Dream?, 44 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 337, 356 (2007) (discussing OR. REV. STAT.
§ 114.105 (1990)).
11 See McGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 147, § 3.2, at 131. It might also be possible
to avoid a forced share for descendants by entering into an express contract with a
third party not to revoke the will, which could lead to litigation over whether good
consideration was offered for the contract.
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countries which retain a forced share for descendants from doing so.
If there is a sound policy basis for protecting the inheritance rights of
descendants, then the mere fact that those who are sufficiently well
informed can partially evade any statutory scheme ought not preclude
its adoption. There may be some property the testator cannot easily
transfer to third parties inter vivos or remove from the jurisdiction of
the testator's domicile, such as the testator's principal residence and
the personal property located thereon. With regard to this property,
the courts might effectively protect a descendant's share, and could bar
any devisee receiving unreachable property from participating in the
reachable assets." 9 The question, then, is not whether it is possible as
a practical matter to implement a forced share for descendants, but
whether one would be justified as a matter of policy. The next Part
addresses this question.
IV. DISINHERITANCE AND THE CHALLENGE OF ELDERCARE
The discussion in the previous Part has omitted one argument in
favor of freedom of testation: it allows a parent to reward or
reimburse children for services performed during the parent's lifetime.
This argument is at least as familiar as those discussed in the previous
Part, and, like the other arguments, has its detractors as well as its
proponents. On the one hand, various authors over the centuries have
argued that testation is necessary in order to preserve the good order
of the family.19° Anthropologists have shown that gifts are sometimes
best understood in a context of reciprocity and social exchange.1 9 '
Several modern economists have argued that parents may use bequests
to reward children who are more attentive to them in old age. 192
189 This could be accomplished through a recapture scheme similar to that of the
UPC. See BRASHIER, supra note 10, at 11-12, 21-23.
190 See, e.g., 1 BENTHAM, supra note 125, at 337 (arguing that testation prevents
ingratitude on part of children in parent's old age); 2 BRACTON, supra note 124, at 181
(arguing that testation will "put in the way of both wives and children an occasion for
good behavior").
19l See CLAUDE LIvI-STRAUSS, THE ELEMENTARY STRUCTURES OF KINSHIP 52-68 Games
Harle Bell et al. trans., rev. ed., Beacon Press 1969) (1949); MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT:
THE FORM AND REASON FOR EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC SOCIETIES 8-18 (W.D. Halls trans.,
Routledge 1990) (1950).
192 For examples of this argument, see especially Gary S. Becker & Kevin M.
Murphy, The Family and the State, 31 J.L. & ECON. 1, 18 (1988); B. Douglas Bernheim
et al., The Strategic Bequest Motive, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1045, 1046 (1985); and Donald
Cox, Motives for Private Income Transfers, 95 J. POL. ECON 508, 540 (1987). The
opposite conclusion, however, is reached by Maria G. Perozek, A Reexamination of the
Strategic Bequest Motive, 106 J. POL. ECON. 423, 424 (1998), who argues that "the
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On the other hand, some have responded that freedom of testation
encourages beneficiaries to engage in socially wasteful activities in the
hope of capturing a bequest. 93 Others have noted that many children
would no doubt continue to care for elderly parents even if the United
States abolished freedom of testation; whether a particular child looks
after an elderly mother or father may not be correlated with that
child's expectations regarding inheritance.'94 Thus, while scholars
have long recognized a possible connection between eldercare and
testamentary freedom, they have disagreed as to the significance of
that connection.
This Part contends that demographic changes over the past few
decades have considerably strengthened the argument that society
should tolerate freedom of testation because it allows parents to
reward children for lifetime services. Increasingly, now that parents
are living longer and surviving formerly fatal medical conditions, they
call upon their children to assist them with basic life needs. Not all
children answer this call, and parents should be able to reward those
who do by leaving them a larger share of the parents' property at
death. The greater the challenge eldercare poses, the stronger the case
for testamentary freedom.
A. The Eldercare Dilemma
There is little doubt that individuals are living longer today than
they did in the past. According to data from the Center for Disease
Control, not only did average life expectancy at birth increase rise
markedly from 1950 to 2001, but average life expectancy at age sixty-
five also increased significantly over the same period.'95 A lower rate
of infant mortality may be a factor in the overall rise in life expectancy,
but it does not explain the increase in life expectancy at age sixty-five.
Advances in medical technology, along with improved nutrition, help
association between bequeathable wealth and attention weakens when child and
family characteristics are added to the specification."
193 This phenomenon is termed "rent-seeking." See James M. Buchanan, Rent
Seeking, Noncompensated Transfers, and Laws of Succession, 26 J.L. & ECON. 71, 71-72(1983); Hirsch & Wang, supra note 128, at 10 & n.34, 11; see also Ascher, supra note
160, at 112 ("Children all too often make their parents' lives miserable trying to
ensure places for themselves in their parents' wills.").
194 See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 128, at 11.
191 Average life expectancy at birth increased from 68.2 years in 1950 to 77.2 in
2001, while average life expectancy at age 65 increased from 13.9 to 18.1. Elizabeth
Arias, United States Life Tables, 2001, NAT'L VITAL STAT. REP., Feb. 18, 2004, at 33,
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr52/nvsr52_14.pdf.
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to explain why people are living longer today than they did in the
early twentieth century."' Moreover, because of high fertility after
World War 11, the percentage of the population over sixty-five years of
age is expected to rise dramatically after 2010.' In recognition of
these facts, the United Nations designated 1999 as "The Year of the
Older Person."' 98 Based on current predictions of population growth,
a similar designation could apply to the twenty-first century.
Improved health care may have significantly improved the lot of
elderly persons in the United States, but it has also increased the
number of individuals who survive to old age despite having chronic
conditions that require long-term care. 99 Although many elderly
people are capable of functioning independently, others must rely on
caregivers for assistance, particularly if they have medical conditions
that require constant treatment. When this occurs, the elderly often
turn to their children and other relatives as the most likely source of
help, or the relatives may volunteer out of a sense of duty to the
elderly person.2 °° Services provided by unpaid caregivers can range
from transportation, grocery shopping, housework, managing
finances, preparing meals, giving medicines, and arranging services, to
more basic activities such as dressing, bathing, toileting, and
feeding.20'
Although some elderly persons with sufficient wealth can turn to
paid caregivers for assistance, others may not have sufficient funds to
do so or may not welcome hired help.20 2  Moreover, if the care
recipient has limited resources, arranging for paid care could
196 KINSELLA & VELKOFF, supra note 15, at 1.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 ROBERT B. FRIEDLAND & LAURA SUMMER, DEMOGRAPHY Is NOT DESTINY, REVISITED
55 (2005), available at http://www.agingsociety.org/agingsociety/publications/
demography/demographydestiny.pdf.
200 For documentation of such behavior, see CAREGIVING, supra note 18, at 34-35; Jane
Gross, As Parents Age, Baby Boomers and Business Struggle to Cope, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25,
2006, at Al; Jane Gross, Forget the Career: My Parents Need Me at Home, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
24, 2005, at Al [hereinafter Gross, Forget the Career]; and Maggie Jackson, More Sons Are
Juggling Jobs and Care for Parents, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2003, at 3:39, available at
http//query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E01EFD61E39F936A25755COA9659C8B
63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all.
201 CAREGIVING, supra note 18, at 47.
202 Moreover, if a child pays a third party to provide care to an elderly parent, there
will be associated agency costs, and there may be some ambiguity as to whether the
paid caregiver is an agent of the child or of the parent. Cf. Robert H. Sitkoff, An
Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 623-25 (2004) (discussing
competing principal-agent relationships in trust context).
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necessitate selling off some of the care recipient's assets and moving
the person to a nursing home, which might be undesirable for all
parties involved.0 3 It is far more common for paid care to be used as a
supplement to informal care than for it to displace informal care
completely.2 4 In any event, current estimates indicate that "after 2015
the number of people likely to need long-term care will increase
substantially faster than the number of people available either as
family or paid caregivers. "205
Some adult children choose to leave behind productive careers and
devote their time to caring for elderly parents.2 6 Other children
remain in the workplace but devote a significant amount of time to
helping their parents with medication management, transportation,
and other needs. 2 7 These activities can negatively affect the caregiving
child's job performance and may lead to increased stress even if the
203 Many older persons prefer to stay at home rather than enter a nursing home
facility, "not only because of the images they have of institutional care, but because
they are better off psychologically and socially in familiar surroundings." JAMES A.
THORSON, AGING IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 261 (2d. ed. 2000); see also Eugene V.
Boisaubin et al., Perceptions of Long-Term Care, Autonomy, and Dignity, by Residents,
Family and Care-Givers: The Houston Experience, 32 J. MED. & PHIL. 447, 458-459
(2007) (discussing survey of long-term-care residents, family members, and health-
care providers in which "[k]eeping the elderly living in a caring and loving home care
situation (theirs or family) for as long as possible was the situation most preferred by
almost everyone"); Rebecca A. Johnson et al., Residential Preferences and Eldercare
Views of Hispanic Elders, J. CROSS-CULTURAL GERONTOLOGY 91, 97-98 (1997) (reporting
that independence was strong factor promoting happiness among elderly Hispanics,
and "[tihe most preferred source of assistance or care was the subjects' children and
family, followed by friends and an outside 'helper' or community services"). On the
prevalence of abuse in institutional care facilities, see STAFF OF REP. HENRY A. WAXMAN,
ABUSE OF RESIDENTS IS A MAJOR PROBLEM IN U.S. NURSING HOMES 4-8 (2001), available
at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20040830113750-34049.pdf. Recent data
indicate that although the percentage of elderly persons who receive formal (paid)
care in addition to informal care increased from 24.4% to 28.0% from 1989 to 1994,
the percentage who received formal care alone decreased from 9.0% to 7.8% over the
same period. By far the largest percentage of elderly persons (66.6% in 1989 and
64.3% in 1994) receive only informal care. CTR. ON AN AGING SOC'Y, A DECADE OF
INFORMAL CAREGIVING 5 (2005) [hereinafter DECADE], available at
http://ihcrp.georgetown.edu/agingsociety/pubhtml/caregiverl/caregiverl.html (citing
statistics from U.S. Department of Commerce).
204 DECADE, supra note 203, at 5.
205 See ROBERT B. FRIEDLAND, CAREGIVERS AND LONG-TERM CARE NEEDS IN THE 21ST
CENTURY: WILL PUBLIC POLICY MEET THE CHALLENGE? 1 (2004), available at
http://tc.georgetown.edu/pdfs/caregiversfriedland.pdf.
206 See Gross, Forget the Career, supra note 200. The percentage of informal
caregivers who live with the care recipient, however, appears to be declining. See
DECADE, supra note 203, at 3.
207 See Jackson, supra note 200.
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caregiver is successfully able to balance work and family
responsibilities. °8 Children who do not live in the immediate vicinity
of their parents are particularly likely to miss days of work or
rearrange their work schedules because of caregiving
responsibilities.209
Although both men and women contribute to eldercare, the burden
is not evenly distributed between the sexes. According to a recent
survey, approximately sixty-one percent of unpaid caregivers are
women. 210 Women are also likely to provide more hours of care than
men and to perform more difficult (and less pleasant) tasks such as
bathing, feeding, and toileting.211 Predictably, therefore, a larger
percentage of women than men report experiencing emotional stress
as a result of caregiving.212 Women also more frequently report that
they did not have a choice regarding whether to provide care.21 3
When there is more than one adult child in a family, one child
commonly bears a greater share of the caregiving burden.21 4 In some
families, children provide care without regard to the contributions of
their siblings, but in other families, a child's provision of care is
inversely proportional to the care provided by siblings. 25  Although
siblings may provide emotional support to the caregiving child, there
208 Id.; see also CAREGIVING, supra note 18, at 12-13 (finding that emotional stress
and physical strain of caregivers varies with level of caregiving burden).
209 See NAT'L ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING & ZOGBY INT'L, MILES AWAY: THE METLIFE
STUDY OF LONG-DISTANCE CAREGIVING 2 (2004) [hereinafter MILEs AWAY], available at
http://www.caregiving.org/data/milesaway.pdf.
210 CAREGIVING, supra note 18, at 8. The imbalance may be even greater than this
statistic suggests, because some of the men providing care may be doing so not for
their own parent, but for a mother-in-law or father-in-law, meaning the daughter's
family continues to bear the greater eldercare burden. Recent data suggest that the
number of men who provide informal care is increasing, but whether these men are
providing care for their own parents or grandparents is less clear. See DECADE, supra
note 203, at 2.
211 CAREGIVING, supra note 18, at 8.
212 Id. at 9.
213 Id. at 8.
214 See Tennille J. Checkovich & Steven Stern, Shared Caregiving Responsibilities of
Adult Siblings with Elderly Parents, 37 J. HUM. RESOURCES 441, 442-43 & tbl.1 (2002)
(citing data from National Long Term Care Survey indicating that, while shared
caregiving is "important phenomenon" in families with multiple children, provision of
care by single caregiver is more common in those families); see also CAREGIVING, supra
note 18, at 10 (noting that more than 37% of caregivers report receiving no assistance
from others, while only 10% of those who report shared caregiving responsibilities say
that division of responsibilities is equal).
215 Checkovich & Stern, supra note 214, at 444.
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is also a significant possibility of intersibling conflict.216 Thus, while
the unequal distribution of care may or may not reflect an agreement
among the siblings, the reality is that some children provide more care
than others.
Just as increases in life expectancy have made eldercare more of a
necessity, changes in the average childbearing cycle have made the
provision of care more difficult for some adult children. Over the past
few decades, the mean age of mothers in the United States has
increased significantly. 217 Because couples are waiting longer to start
their own families, it has become more common for individuals to
provide care for elderly parents and at least partially dependent
children simultaneously. 218 A recent study found that approximately
nine percent of women ages forty-five to fifty-six in the United States
give a significant amount of care to both their children and their
parents, thus falling into what has been termed the "sandwich
generation. ' ' 21 9 Caregivers in this category are likely to face additional
emotional stress and negative career consequences in comparison with
those whose responsibilities are not divided.2 On the other hand,
some potential caregivers who have children of their own may attempt
to delegate the responsibility of eldercare to their siblings who do not
have children or whose children are independent. 2 1 Thus, the rising
age at which women have children has the potential not only to make
eldercare more difficult, but also to spread the burden more unevenly
among siblings.
Geographical mobility among adult children also makes caregiving
more difficult and may lead to a more unequal burden. Migration is
216 CAREGIVING, supra note 18, at 8.
217 T.J. Matthews & Brady E. Hamilton, Mean Age of Mother, 1970-2000, in NAT'L
VITAL STAT. REP., Dec. 11, 2002, at 1, 2 (showing increase from mean age of 24.6 in
1970 to 27.2 in 2000).
218 See Emily Grundy & John C. Henretta, Between Elderly Parents and Adult
Children: A New Look at the Intergenerational Care Provided by the "Sandwich
Generation," AGEING & SOC'Y, Sept. 2006, at 707, 707-08 (finding that, although it is
unusual for individuals to provide care for aging parents and underage children
simultaneously, individuals more commonly take care of aging parents and adult, but
partially dependent, children).
219 Charles R. Pierret, The "Sandwich Generation": Women Caring for Parents and
Children, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Sept. 2006, at 3, 3-4.
220 See Cyndi Brannen, Women's Unpaid Caregiving and Stress, CENTRES OF
EXCELLENCE FOR WOMEN'S HEALTH RES. BULL., Apr. 4, 2006, at 12, 13.
221 See Benit Ingersoll-Dayton, Redressing Inequity in Parent Care Among Siblings, J.
MARRIAGE & FAM., Feb. 1, 2003, at 201, 208 (discussing how additional family
responsibilities such as provision of child care can affect distribution of eldercare
responsibilities among siblings).
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common in the United States, especially among the college-educated
population.222 A recent survey found that approximately five percent
of caregivers live between one and two hours away from their parents,
and ten percent live more than two hours away.223 Driving long
distances imposes an additional strain on caregivers, forcing them in
many cases to make significant career adjustments.224  Not
surprisingly, these long-distance caregivers tend to rely heavily on
siblings who live closer to the care recipients.225 In many cases,
siblings will expect the child who lives closest to an aging parent to
take on the primary caregiving responsibilities for the parent,
particularly if that child is female and has fewer career or family
responsibilities of her own.226 If that child is not willing to take on the
job, however, a sibling who lives further away may make considerable
sacrifices to perform the caregiving role.
B. Eldercare and Estate Division: Empirical Evidence
This unequal distribution of caregiving responsibilities raises the
question of whether elderly parents reward those children who
provide more care. Prior to the last decade or so, the studies
conducted on individual preferences for postmortem distribution of
property generally did not focus on the possible effect that caregiving
might have on that distribution. 227 Because equal division of estates
222 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DOMESTIC MIGRATION ACROSS REGIONS, DIVISIONS, AND
STATES, 1995 TO 2000, at 1 (2003) (reporting that over 22 million Americans moved
from one state to another from 1995 to 2000); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MIGRATION OF THE
YOUNG, SINGLE, AND COLLEGE EDUCATED, 1995 TO 2000 (2003) (reporting that over
three-quarters of young, single, and college-educated U.S. population moved between
1995 and 2000, and about one-quarter of young, single, and college-educated
residents of central U.S. cities moved there from another state).
223 CAREGIVING, supra note 18, at 42.
224 See MILES AWAY, supra note 209, at 9.
225 See id. at 12.
226 See Francine Russo, Who Cares More for Mom?, TIME, June 20, 2005, at F7,
available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1071271-2,00.html
(quoting Cleveland University sociologist Sarah Matthews).
227 For a sample of the older literature, see Allison Dunham, The Method, Process,
and Frequency of Wealth Transmission at Death, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 241, 252-55
(1963); Paul Menchik, Primogeniture, Equal Sharing, and the U.S. Distribution of
Wealth, Q.J. ECON., Mar. 1980, at 299, 303-04; Paul Menchik, Unequal Estate
Division: Is It Altruism, Reverse Bequests, or Simply Noise?, in DENIS KESSLER &
ANDRE MASSON, MODELLING THE ACCUMULATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH 105,
111-14 (1988); Mark 0. Wilhelm, Bequest Behavior and the Effect of Heirs' Earnings:
Testing the Altruistic Model of Bequests, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 874, 890-91 (1996); and
Sheldon F. Kurtz, Comment, A Comparison of Iowans' Dispositive Preferences with
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appeared to be the norm, scholars tended to focus their attention on
the motivations for equal division . 2 8 As eldercare has become a more
important phenomenon, however, researchers have begun to examine
whether the receipt of care plays a role in the estate planning of those
elderly who opt for unequal division. 29 Current research suggests that
the answer is yes, at least in some cases, and that the effect tends to
favor children who have provided or are expected to provide care. 30
In 2005, Edward Norton and Donald Taylor conducted a study of
estate division practices that has some bearing on the relationship
between caregiving and testamentary distribution.2 1 1  Norton and
Taylor combined data from a study of elderly individuals in five North
Carolina counties with actual probate records from those counties.232
Examining probate files of unmarried individuals with at least two
children, Norton and Taylor found that equal division among the
children occurred in seventy to eighty-three percent of the cases,
depending on what definition of "equal" was used.233 However, the
researchers determined that two factors made it more likely for a
parent to divide the property unequally among the children: having a
larger number of children and revising a will within five years of
death. 34 Norton and Taylor inferred from that the latter factor that
provision of eldercare may have played a role in the division of estates,
as those who revised a will within five years of death were likely to
have better information about how much care and attention their
children had provided. 5  This finding is consistent with the
hypothesis that caregiving plays a role in the distribution of estates,
although other explanations can be given.236 Norton and Taylor
Selected Provisions of the Iowa and Uniform Probate Codes, 63 IOWA L. REV. 1041,
1100-16 (1978).
228 For a recent attempt to explain this phenomenon, see B. Douglas Bernheim &
Sergei Severinov, Bequests as Signals: An Explanation for the Equal Division Puzzle, 11 J.
POL. ECON. 733, 735 (2003), who argue that parents use equal division to signal to their
children that they love them equally, even if they are partial to one particular child.
229 See sources cited infra notes 231-246.
230 See id.
231 Norton & Taylor, supra note 130, at 79-80.
232 Id. at 72. Norton and Taylor relied on the Piedmont Health Survey of the
Elderly, a survey of individuals age 65 and over who resided in five North Carolina
counties from 1986 to 1993. Id.
233 Id. at 74. The strict definition included only equal divisions of property, while
the looser definition included divisions that were nearly equal (within two percent).
See id. at 73.
234 Id. at 79-80.
235 Id.
236 For example, a parent who revises his or her will shortly before death would
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reported having encountered "examples in the probate records where
parents explicitly rewrote wills a few years prior to death and changed
the allocation due to recent interactions (or lack of interactions) with
their children.
237
Although the Norton and Taylor study gives some support for a
correlation between caregiving by children and the division of estates,
a recent study by Meta Brown provides stronger evidence. In an
article published in 2006 in the Journal of Human Resources, Brown
offered additional proof that parents with care needs may adjust their
estate plans to reward children who are current or projected
caregivers.23 Brown's study analyzed data from the first wave of the
Assets and Health Dynamics among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) study of
U.S. residents age sixty-nine and over. She determined that, with
respect to unmarried parents with two or more living children,
"parents more often make end-of-life transfers to children who
provide them with regular care and to the children they expect to care
for them should the need arise. ' 239 Like Norton and Taylor, Brown
reported that equal division among all the children was the norm.24°
When parents did opt for unequal division, however, current or
expected provision of care by a child commonly resulted in the child
receiving a greater share of the estate.241
The data in the AHEAD study included information on current
caregiving provided by children as well as predictions regarding future
care. 42 The study also indicated which children were included in the
parents' wills and whether the division among those children was
equal or unequal, as well as information on life insurance policies and
beneficiary designations.2 43  Performing a regression on this data,
Brown found a strong correlation between the provision of care by a
child whose parent had current care needs and expected end-of-life
transfers from the parent to that child.244 Brown also found a similar
also have better information about the children's finances, which could also influence
the division of the estate in an altruistic model. See id. at 80.
237 Id.
238 Meta Brown, Informal Care and the Division of End-of-Life Transfers, 41 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 191, 217 (2006).
239 Id. The first wave of the AHEAD study did not include individuals who reside
in institutions such as nursing homes. Id. at 199.
240 Id. at 203 tbl.2 (reporting that 49.8% of all decedents in survey provided equally
for their children by will and that 37.1% did not have wills).
241 See id. at 193.
242 Id. at 199.
243 Id. at 199-200.
244 Id. at 211 tbl.1 (finding positive correlation at one-percent significance level).
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correlation in the planned end-of-life transfers from parents who did
not have current care needs, except that the expected transfers were to
children whom the parents predicted would be future caregivers. 45
Parents in both groups evidently intended to transfer more of their
wealth to caregiving children.246
The Brown study has important implications for inheritance law.
Because the U.S. does not mandate equal division of property among
the testator's children, it allows parents to reward their children for
providing eldercare. If an American state adopted a forced share for
children, testators in that state would have less flexibility to respond
to the provision of care through the division of their property at death.
A family maintenance system would delegate the decision to a court
rather than to the parent. The U.S. rule allows a parent to punish a
child for failing to provide care, but it also allows a parent to reward a
child (or someone else) who does provide care. 247 Therefore, changing
the U.S. rule requires the conclusion that rewarding caregivers for
their services is either not a sufficient justification for disinheritance
or that the parent is not the best person to decide whether a child
deserves to be rewarded.
In assessing the role of end-of-life transfers in the provision of
eldercare, one must concede that children often provide care
altruistically, without regard to any monetary reward. In an
unpublished study, Brown herself has come to this conclusion. 48
Because the amount of bequeathable wealth diminishes over the
245 Id. (one-percent significance level).
246 Parents with current care needs in the survey intended to transfer an average of
$11,303 more to caregiving children, while other parents intended to transfer an
average of $22,301 more to children expected to provide help in the future. Id. at 193.
Brown's findings are consistent with an earlier study by Audrey Light and Kathleen
McGarry, who examined interviews that were conducted in 1999 as part of the
National Longitudinal Surveys of Mature Women and Young Women. Analyzing this
data, Light and McGarry found that, among mothers who reported an intention to
divide their estates unequally, those who were over age 75 or in poor health were
significantly more likely to give an exchange-related explanation, such as the
provision of additional care by one child. Audrey Light & Kathleen McGarry, Why
Parents Play Favorites: Explanations for Unequal Bequests, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 1669,
1678 (2004).
247 See, e.g., In re Estate of Price, 388 N.W.2d 72, 75-76, 80 (Neb. 1986)
(upholding will devising property to daughter and son-in-law who cared for testator
when he was ill); Lipper v. Weslow, 369 S.W.2d 698, 700-03 (Tex. App. 1963)
(reversing finding of undue influence when testator rewarded children who were
"attentive" to her and her husband "especially during the past few years when we have
not been well"); see also Leslie, supra note 52, at 248 n.68 (citing similar cases).
248 Meta Brown, End-of-Life Transfers and the Decision to Care for a Parent (Feb.
2007) (unpublished manuscript, at 2, httpJ/www.ssc.wisc.edu/-mbrown/EndofLife3.pdf).
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lifetime of the parent, a child who helps prolong the parent's life by
providing eldercare may receive a smaller bequest than he or she
would if the parent died immediately. 249 Analyzing the AHEAD data,
Brown found "no evidence that children's caregiving behavior is
influenced by parents' planned bequests. '25 ° Thus, unequal treatment
by the parents may not have much of an effect on the willingness of
children to provide care.
Nevertheless, even if end-of-life transfers are not necessary to induce
altruistic children to provide care, there is still a moral argument for
allowing parents to reward children who have provided care through
unequal estate division. When one child has worked harder than
others have, sacrificing career goals and serenity as a result, it seems
right and fair for a parent to reward that child with a larger bequest.
Conversely, by guaranteeing each child an equal share, a forced-
heirship regime may reward children who have not shouldered their
share of the eldercare burden, and make the caregiving child become
resentful of undeserving siblings. It will also treat sons and daughters
equally, despite the evidence that women devote more time than men
to taking care of their parents. 251 The U.S. rule avoids this apparent
unfairness. Moreover, to the extent that any child is not altruistically
motivated, restrictions on testamentary freedom would, limit the utility
of wealth as an inducement for care.
Assuming that the parent is of sound mind and not subject to undue
influence, fraud, or duress, the parent is uniquely qualified to pass
judgment on the amount and quality of care each child provided. No
one is better positioned to see how much care is being offered than the
recipient of that care, assuming the recipient is mentally competent
and not subject to undue influence.252 If, rather, the decision is left to
a court or jury, persons who did not witness the actual care and who
are guided by their own general assumptions about how children
behave will make the determination. The U.S. rule utilizes this
informational advantage of the testator. Although a forced-share
regime might give the testator flexibility of disposition with regard to
most or all of the estate, some portion would necessarily pass to all the
249 Id. (manuscript at 1-2).
250 Id. (manuscript at 41). On the other hand, the provision of care does appear to
respond to "the expected present value of life insurance settlements." Id.
251 See supra notes 210-213 and accompanying text.
252 As discussed above, the U.S. probate system is quite good at ensuring that the
testator had competent volition - in fact, it arguably overprotects against that
prospect, and may frustrate the intent of some competent testators. Supra notes 52-54
and accompanying text.
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children whether they deserve it or not. In contrast, by allowing
complete testamentary freedom when the testator has competent
volition, the U.S. rule puts the decision in the hands of the one who
has the best knowledge of all the relevant facts. When one
individual - often, but not always, a descendant - has helped the
testator more than anyone else, the testator is uniquely situated to
notice the difference and reward that individual accordingly.
It is unfortunate, but inevitable, that some testators will not use the
information at their disposal to reach a fair decision. 5 3 Yet much the
same could be said of supposedly neutral judges and jurors, not only
in the flawed U.S. probate system,. 4 but also in jurisdictions with a
meritocratic judiciary.255 Anyone can err, particularly when someone
else's property is involved. Because the testator accumulated the
wealth that will be distributed at death, there is a strong case for
entrusting the testator with the difficult choice of who should inherit
that wealth.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER REFORM
Thus far, this Article has essentially made a case for the status quo:
that is, for retaining a theoretically unlimited power to disinherit
adult, non-disabled children. This Part will ask whether anything
about inheritance law in the U.S. should be changed in light of the
eldercare problem, beginning with the treatment of caregivers when
someone dies without leaving a will. Testamentary freedom, by itself,
will not solve the problem of eldercare: indeed, it is doubtful whether
any change to inheritance law could accomplish that goal. If the
253 For example, a parent who abused a child in the past still has the power to
disinherit that child, and a parent could disinherit a child for reasons that have
nothing to do with the provision of care by other children. Distinguishing these
situations from the usual case, however, would involve giving considerable discretion
to the finder of fact, which, as discussed above, may not work in the U.S. probate
system. See supra notes 171-176 and accompanying text. Judicial intervention may be
necessary, however, when the testator goes beyond merely dividing the property and
attempts to restrain the personal freedom of the devisees. See Daphna Lewinsohn-
Zamir, More Is Not Always Better than Less: An Exploration in Property Law, 92 MINN.
L. REV. 634, 644-47 (2008); Jeffrey G. Sherman, Posthumous Meddling: An
Instrumentalist Theory of Testamentary Restraints on Conjugal and Religious Choices,
1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1273, 1301-06; Tate, supra note 123, at 464-66, 491-96.
254 See Langbein, supra note 58, at 2044-45; see also supra notes 171-176 and
accompanying text (discussing problems with U.S. probate system).
255 See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (discussing cases from England
and Australia where courts have ordered provision for heir beyond testamentary share
notwithstanding alleged negative conduct toward testator).
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contributions of caregivers are to be properly acknowledged, however,
steps must be taken to protect their interests in cases of intestacy,
while guarding them against meritless will contests when a valid estate
plan does exist.
A. Eldercare and Intestacy
The challenge of eldercare discussed in the previous Part offers a
rational basis for continuing to permit freedom of testation.
Nevertheless, freedom of testation is essentially irrelevant to the
estates of the millions of Americans who die intestate. Evidence
suggests that testate succession remains the exception among ordinary
Americans rather than the rule, although the reverse may be true for
the wealthy.256 When a person dies intestate, the court-appointed
administrator will distribute the property, per the statutory scheme, to
the decedent's heirs. The administrator will not consider caregiving
services in the determination of each heir's intestate share." 7 It is not
possible to capitalize on the informational advantage of the decedent
when the decedent died without any kind of estate plan. Thus, on
intestacy, children who provide more eldercare services will not
automatically be rewarded or compensated for their efforts by
receiving a larger share of the estate.25 8
Although intestacy statutes do not alter the shares of individuals
based on their contributions to the decedent's welfare, those
individuals may still claim property from the estate not as heirs, but as
creditors. In such a case, however, the caregiving individual may be
frustrated by a doctrine known as the "doctrine of non-recovery" or
"family member rule."259 Normally, under the law of contracts, when
a person undertakes to perform services for someone "in the apparent
expectation of payment," the law presumes that the person was
256 Recent studies suggest that 39% to 48% of American adults have a valid will,
although the figure is higher (up to 69%) for wealthier Americans. See DUKEMINIER ET
AL., supra note 30, at 59 (citing surveys by Roper Center for Public Opinion Research).
257 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-102 to -103 (1990) (allocating shares to
surviving spouse and descendants without regard to provision of caregiving services).
258 Given the problems associated with judicial discretion under family
maintenance statutes, see supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text, it is not clear that
giving the court a power to adjust the shares of heirs on the basis of caregiving
services (rather than simply compensate them for the actual value of services
provided) would be a good solution in any event.
259 See Jonathan S. Henes, Compensating Caregiving Relatives: Abandoning the
Family Member Rule in Contracts, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 705, 706 (1996); Heather M.
Fossen Forrest, Comment, Loosening the Wrapper on the Sandwich Generation: Private
Compensation for Family Caregivers, 63 LA. L. REV. 381, 391 (2003).
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"offering to furnish them for reasonable compensation," and thus may
bring an implied contract claim. 6° When the person is providing
services for a family member, however, the presumption is reversed.
Thus, the claimant will have to prove that the services were not
gratuitous. 261  The burden is therefore on the caregiving family
member to show that she performed the services with the expectation
of compensation.
In practice, when the caregiver expends considerable effort in taking
care of a relative who is elderly and infirm, courts tend to find the
presumption rebutted and allow an implied contract claim to
proceed.62 Such cases, however, tend to involve a claim by an in-
home caregiver providing continuous care for an elderly relative, not a
260 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.10 (2d ed. 2001).
261 Id. Family caregivers also face difficulty bringing restitution claims. The
original Restatement of Restitution provides that "[a] person who has conferred a
benefit upon another, manifesting that he does not expect compensation therefor, is
not entitled to restitution merely because his expectation that the other will make a
gift to him or enter into a contract with him is not realized." RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
RESTITUTION § 57 (1937). The case of a nephew providing support to an elderly aunt
out of a sense of moral obligation to the family, without manifesting an intention that
he would be compensated, was specifically mentioned as a case where no restitution is
warranted. Id. § 57 cmt. b, illus. 1. A discussion draft of the pending Restatement
(Third) of Restitution states that "[tihere is no liability in restitution in respect of a
benefit intentionally conferred by the claimant on the recipient, unless the
circumstances of the transaction are such as to excuse the claimant from the necessity
of basing a claim to payment on a contract with the recipient." RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF RESTITUTION § 2 (Discussion Draft 2000). Exceptions include the provision of
services to protect another person's life, health, property, or economic interests, and
the performance of a duty to supply necessaries to a third person. Id. §§ 20-22. In
some circumstances, it may be possible for a caregiving child to bring a restitution
claim against the noncaregiving children on the theory that all the children owed the
parent a duty of support. See In re Application of Mach, 25 N.W.2d 881, 882-83 (S.D.
1947); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 22 cmt. g, illus. 8 (Tentative Draft
No. 2, 2002).
262 See, e.g., In re Estate of Beecham, 378 N.W.2d 800, 804 (Minn. 1985) (allowing
daughter-in-law who "rendered around the clock care for an elderly, chronically
incontinent woman" to bring implied contract claim despite presumption of
gratuitousness); In re Estate of Griffith, 758 P.2d 407, 409 (Or. 1988) (finding niece of
decedent overcame presumption when her "usual occupation was in-home care, and
she was normally paid for her services"); Adams v. Underwood, 470 S.W.2d 180, 186
(Tenn. 1971) (finding presumption overcome when daughter moved into her father's
home "for the purpose of rendering services of an extraordinary burdensome nature").
It is difficult to find modern cases where a gratuitous promise is "refused enforcement
solely on the ground that consideration was lacking." Andrew Kull, Reconsidering
Gratuitous Promises, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 44-45 (1992). However, there is a "wealth
of dictum in support of the traditional rule," id. at 45, and this may dissuade some
claimants from pursuing expensive litigation.
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child who lives outside the home but helps the parent with activities
263such as shopping, transportation, and financial management.
Because of the presumption, the latter type of plaintiff is unlikely to
file a claim, or may settle for a lesser amount than the true value of the
services. Even some live-in caregivers may be discouraged from suing,
or settle for less than they deserve, because they fear they will be
unable to rebut the presumption. 64
In recent years, commentators have argued that the presumption of
gratuitousness in the context of eldercare is outdated and needs to be
reformed or rejected entirely.265 Illinois enacted a statute in 1988 that
partly reflects this judgment, allowing a close family member who
"dedicates himself or herself to the care of [a] disabled person by
living with and personally caring for the disabled person for at least 3
years" to bring a claim against the person's estate. 66 However, neither
the recent commentary nor the Illinois statute draws any distinction
between claims brought against the estate of a decedent who left a will
and claims brought against the estate of an intestate. These two
categories of claims involve different policy issues, and therefore
should be evaluated separately.
Although some decedents may die intestate because they have
consciously selected the statutory scheme, those who die intestate
more commonly do so for other reasons. For example, the decedent
263 See sources cited supra note 262.
264 An additional reason not to bring the claim, not related to the presumption of
gratuitousness, is the possibility that success will lead to income tax liability. See 26
U.S.C. § 61(a)(1) (2006) (defining gross income to include "compensation for
services"). If a will does not recite that a testator made a bequest in return for
services, it is unlikely to be subject to income tax. See Rev. Rul. 66-167, 1966-1 C.B.
20. If the caregiver prevails under an implied contract theory, however, the IRS may
claim income tax due on the amount recovered. Nevertheless, depending on the size
of the caregiver's intestate share relative to the value of the caregiving services, it may
be worth paying the income tax in order to recover in implied contract. The
presumption of gratuitousness complicates this calculus by making success less
certain for the caregiver.
265 See Henes, supra note 259, at 718; Forrest, supra note 259, at 392. In general,
the American legal system has a tendency to impose restraints on economic exchange
within intimate relationships, which can lead to undesirable distributive
consequences. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 491, 517-22 (2005). The presumption that caregiving services provided by a
family member are gratuitous may be an example, given that caregivers are more
likely to be female. See sources cited supra note 20.
266 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/18-1.1 (2007). Forrest argues that this statute does not
go far enough, insofar as it is limited to situations where the caregiver and the care
recipient live in the same household and it contains a three-year minimum caregiving
requirement. Forrest, supra note 259, at 405-07.
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may have been afraid to confront the possibility of death,267 unable to
afford an attorney,268 or may have mistakenly assumed that the
statutory scheme would match the decedent's own preferences.269
Given the evidence that testators reward caregiving children,
27 °
presumptively denying a claim on intestacy to such caregivers would
seem to conflict with the goal of state intestacy statutes to give effect
to the average person's intent.
With regard to decedents who die leaving a will, the issues are more
complicated because the case for reversing the presumption for family
caregivers is less clear. The Brown study suggests that parents not
only devise more property to children who are current caregivers, but
also devise more to expected future caregivers. 7 If this is so, then the
division of property in a will may take into account the parent's
estimation of how much care each child will provide in the future,
even if the parent wrote the will before the child actually provided
care. If a caregiving child is presumptively entitled to reimbursement
even when the parent left a will, then the child may be compensated
twice: once by the testator as a devisee and again by the court as a
creditor. Assuming that most children care for their parents for
altruistic reasons, as seems to be the case,272 overcompensating
children for the provision of care may encourage wasteful and
267 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 30, at 59-60; SIGMUND FREUD, Our Attitude
Towards Death, in 4 COLLECTED PAPERS 304, 304-05 (John D. Sutherland ed. & John
Riviere trans., 10th ed., The Hogarth Press Ltd. & Inst. of Psycho-Analysis 1957)
(1925) (noting that one's own death is difficult to imagine).
268 The cost of will drafting is leading to a proliferation of "do-it-yourself" estate
planning software programs, which allow the testator to draft his or her own will by
entering information into a computer. See Gene Meyer, Companies See Potential
Business in Do-It-Yourself Legal Kits, KAN. CITY STAR, Jan. 13, 2008, at D3. Whether
this software will lead to a decline in the percentage of decedents who die intestate
remains to be seen, although it is likely to produce at least some new business for
probate attorneys after the testators die and the mistakes of the inexperienced testators
are brought to light. But cf. Stephen Clowney, In Their Own Hand: An Analysis of
Holographic Wills and Homemade Willmaking, 43 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 27, 70-71
(2008) (finding that will contests are in fact rarely brought to challenge homemade
wills). For an argument that the prevalence of intestacy reflects a failure on the part
of the legal profession to market wills effectively, see Alyssa A. DiRusso & Michael R.
McCunney, Marketing Wills, 16 ELDER L.J. 33, 35 (2008).
269 For an example of this mistake, see Mahoney v. Grainger, 186 N.E. 86, 86
(Mass. 1933) (reviewing will of testator who wished her 25 first cousins to share
equally in her estate, but devised her estate to her "heirs at law," category that under
state law consisted of one person, testator's maternal aunt).
270 See Brown, supra note 238, at 203-17.
271 See id. at 201 tbll.
272 See Brown, supra note 248, at 41.
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manipulative activities on the part of the children without increasing
the supply of genuine eldercare services. 73
In order to address this problem, we might distinguish between
situations where the testator has opted for equal division of the estate
among the children from those where the testator provided one child a
larger share. In the former instance, the law could discourage the
court from adjusting the share of the caregiving child to reflect
expected future services. To make this distinction, however, we
would have to abandon the assumption that the testator is the best
judge of the value of the services that each child provides,274 thereby
making it easier for a court or jury to second-guess the testator's
decision.275
Therefore, rather than reverse the traditional presumption of
gratuitousness in all cases where a family member provides care, we
might make the presumption dependent on whether the care recipient
died intestate or left a will. In cases where the decedent died intestate,
the traditional presumption of gratuitousness would be reversed.
Caregivers would be presumptively entitled to compensation from the
probate estate for services rendered regardless of the relationship with
the decedent, unless the other heirs can affirmatively show that the
services were intended to be gratuitous. 276 When the decedent left a
273 See Buchanan, supra note 193, on the problem of rent-seeking in inheritance
law. The provision of care by persons unrelated to the decedent could conceivably be
more responsive to anticipated bequests, and a similar argument might be made
concerning relatives by affinity, such as daughters-in-law and sons-in-law. See infra
note 277. With regard to those caregivers, the risk of overcompensation may be
outweighed by the incentives for eldercare created by treating them like other
creditors of the decedent. Moreover, there may be less cause to trust the testator's
judgment when caregiving by a son-in-law or daughter-in-law is involved because the
testator may not view spouses of children as natural objects of his or her bounty
notwithstanding the caregiving they provide. Cf. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402(g) (West
1991 & Supp. 2008) (allocating share on intestacy to certain relatives by affinity of
decedent when decedent left no next of kin, but excluding daughters-in-law and sons-
in-law of decedent). When the will devises some property to a son-in-law, daughter-
in-law, or unrelated person, however, the heirs might be allowed to argue that the
devise was meant to satisfy the obligation to repay the caregiver for services
performed.
274 See supra text accompanying note 254.
275 To some extent, courts may already engage in this second-guessing by
manipulating undue influence and will formalities statutes so as to protect members of
the testator's family. See Melanie B. Leslie, Enforcing Family Promises: Reliance,
Reciprocity, and Relational Contract, 77 N.C. L. REV. 551, 586-608 (1999). A rule that
presumptively allowed family caregivers to claim an implied contract when a decedent
left a will could exacerbate this tendency.
276 Whether or not this presumption is reversed on intestacy, a statute should also
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will, on the other hand, and the caregiver was a family member whose
services could be anticipated by the decedent, the traditional rule
would apply, and the caregiver would need to rebut the presumption
of gratuitousness, perhaps by showing that the services provided were
unusually burdensome or the care recipient indicated an intent to pay
the caregiver.2 77 This rule could be promulgated by statute, or, since
the presumption of gratuitousness is generally a matter of common
law, by judicial decision.
Making a distinction on the basis of whether the care recipient died
intestate is not necessarily a simple solution. In particular, courts will
have to decide what rule to apply when the decedent died partially
intestate or employed one or more nonprobate will substitutes to
dispose of a significant share of her property. 278 Courts might also
provide for the opposite situation, namely elder abuse. When an heir or devisee has
abused an elderly decedent, that person should forfeit his or her share. Cf. CAL. PROB.
CODE § 259 (West 2002) (restricting ability of abuser to inherit damages awarded to
victim's estate or to serve as victim's fiduciary). However, state statutes vary widely in
their treatment of abuse of decedents, and it is not clear that a bright-line rule is the
most effective strategy. See Anne-Marie Rhodes, Consequences of Heirs' Misconduct:
Moving from Rules to Discretion, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 975, 986-87, 990-91 (2007)
(arguing in favor of more subjective approach).
277 Cf. FARNSWORTH, supra note 260, § 3.10 ("The presumption can be rebutted if,
for example, the services are unusually onerous and there are expressions of intent to
pay."). If a caregiving child was not yet born or adopted by the testator at the time the
will was executed, or was believed by the testator to be dead, he or she may be
protected by a pretermitted child statute if nothing is left to him or her in the will.
For an example of such a statute, see UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-302 (1990). Relatives
other than children, however, would not benefit from a pretermitted child statute in
most jurisdictions, and the presumption of gratuitousness might be reversed for such
individuals if they first become known to the care recipient after execution of a will.
Moreover, it is not clear that the presumption of gratuitousness should apply in any
case to relatives by affinity, such as sons-in-law and daughters-in-law, even though
such individuals may assist with caregiving. But cf. In re Estate of Beecham, 378
N.W.2d 800, 803-04 (Minn. 1985) (applying presumption to daughter-in-law, but
holding it rebutted given nature of services performed). On the special issues raised
when eldercare is provided by friends of the care recipient, see David Horton, The
Uneasy Case for California's Care Custodian Statute, 11 CHAP. L. REV. (forthcoming
2008) (manuscript at 21-24, http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
1184610); Ethan J. Leib, Friendship and the Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 631, 697-99 (2007);
and Kirsten M. Kwasneski, Comment, The Danger of a Label: How the Legal
Interpretation of "Care Custodian" Can Frustrate a Testator's Wish to Make a Gift to a
Personal Friend, 36 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 269, 283-90 (2006).
278 On the increasing popularity of nonprobate will substitutes, and the reasons for
their popularity, see John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the
Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1109-25 (1984); and Kent D. Schenkel,
Testamentary Fragmentation and the Diminishing Role of the Will: An Argument for
Revival, 41 CREIGHTON L. REV. 155, 170-77 (2008).
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struggle with cases where the testator left a will later deemed to be
invalid, either because it failed to satisfy the statutory formalities, or
because it was procured by fraud, undue influence, or some other
unjust cause. In some cases, it may be difficult to decide whether
reversal of the presumption of gratuitousness is warranted.
The problem of wills that fail to satisfy statutory formalities would be
reduced or eliminated by the enactment of a statute similar to the
"harmless error" provision of the UPC. This uniform law allows the
court to probate a document on the basis of clear and convincing
evidence that it was intended to be the decedent's will, even if the
formalities are not complied with.279 John Langbein has made a
convincing case, which does not depend on the provision of eldercare,
for the enactment of such a provision.8 ° If the court excuses harmless
defects in execution, a child intentionally omitted from the will cannot
gain an undue advantage in a contract claim simply because a parent
failed to comply with the technical requirements for executing a will.
On the other hand, courts could resolve cases of partial intestacy or
provision by will substitute on the basis of how comprehensive or fully
realized the nonprobate or partial testamentary disposition is and how
likely it is to reflect a considered evaluation of the caregiver's services.
When the court sets aside a will on the ground of undue influence,
fraud, duress, or lack of testamentary capacity, there is a tougher
policy dilemma. In such cases, the main beneficiary under the
invalidated will may well be the family caregiver, who has persuaded
the testator to alter the estate plan in the caregiver's favor.2 81 It may be
unjust to reward the caregiver by facilitating an implied contract claim
when the caregiver's wrongdoing frustrated the testator's intent. If the
court allows an implied contract claim, however, this may have the
beneficial effect of discouraging meritless will contests, as the
contestants have less to gain in the event the will is set aside.
279 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (1990).
280 See John H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors in the Execution of Wills: A
Report on Australia's Tranquil Revolution in Probate Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4-5
(1987); see also Stephanie Lester, Admitting Defective Wills to Probate, Twenty Years
Later: New Evidence for the Adoption of the Harmless Error Rule, 42 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR.J. 577, 603-06 (2007) (suggesting that Australian courts applying "harmless error"
rule since 1987 "continue, overall, to be extremely successful in distinguishing cases
where the decedent accidentally or mistakenly failed to comply with Wills Act
formalities from those where he hesitated to finalize his intentions or where the will
was the subject of fraud"). But see John V. Orth, Wills Act Formalities: How Much
Compliance Is Enough?, 43 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 73, 78-81 (2008) (arguing that it
is difficult to tell whether courts apply "harmless error" provisions correctly).
281 See sources cited supra note 247.
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As a compromise, a statute might direct the courts to disallow the
caregiver's implied contract claim only when the caregiver's behavior
was particularly egregious, such as when the caregiver procured the
will through fraud, malice, or bad faith. Depending on the nature of
the testator's interference, the caregiver might forfeit the allocated
testamentary share, but still be presumptively able, as a creditor of the
estate, to recover the fair value of unpaid services performed,
assuming that the success of the will contest results in the estate
passing by intestacy.282
One obvious objection to reversing the presumption of
gratuitousness in cases where a caregiver provided services to an
intestate relative is that it could lead to frequent litigation in an area of
the law normally characterized by cooperative administration.28 This
argument, however, always applies whenever a party is allowed to
bring a claim before a court. Because a caregiver (or an attorney
working on commission) bears the expense of bringing an implied
contract claim, there will be a significant disincentive to bring such
claims when they lack merit or when the estate contains insufficient
assets, even if the presumption is in the caregiver's favor. The main
effect of reversing the presumption may be to enhance the bargaining
position of the caregiver vis-A-vis the other heirs of the decedent, so
that the caregiver will be able to negotiate a fair share without the
necessity of a lawsuit.284 To ensure that this is done only when the
caregiver has a meritorious claim, a jurisdiction might require an
unsuccessful claimant to pay the costs incurred by the estate in
defending litigation, which would prevent so-called "strike suits" from
draining the assets of an estate. 285 This might be a fair tradeoff for the
additional advantage conferred on the caregiver by the reversal of the
presumption on intestacy.
282 In cases where the will contest results in the probate of an earlier will, the
presumption of gratuitousness would apply, on the theory that the previous will
already took into account the future provision of care.
283 On the infrequency of will contests in the United States, see Schoenblum, supra
note 61, at 614. Because intestacy appears to be more common than succession by
will, see supra note 256, facilitating challenges to intestate distribution could have a
more significant impact on the volume of probate court business.
284 Under the UPC, for example, the heirs to an estate may agree to alter their
shares, and such agreement is binding on the personal representative as to the parties
involved. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-912 (1990). If the non-caregiving children know
that the presumption is in favor of the caregiving child on intestacy, they may be more
inclined to reach such an agreement.
285 See Langbein, supra note 58, at 2043 (discussing disadvantages of American rule
requiring litigating parties to bear their own costs).
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B. Reducing Meritless Will Contests
Whether or not state courts or legislatures choose to remove barriers
for caregivers who claim a share on intestacy, they should certainly
ensure meritless will contests do not frustrate testamentary
dispositions intended to benefit caregiving relatives. Under the
Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers, in
order to establish a presumption of undue influence in a gratuitous
transfer, it is necessary to show not only a confidential relationship
with the donor, but also some suspicious circumstances, as when the
donor is in a "weakened condition" or there is a "decided discrepancy
between a new and previous wills or will substitutes of the donor."
2 86
A comment to the Restatement expressly states that "[a] testator's
decision to leave a substantial devise or even the bulk or all of his or
her estate to voluntary caregivers - relatives or other persons
voluntarily caring for the testator - is not a basis for invalidating a
will, in the absence of suspicious circumstances." '287
If the Restatement rule is correctly applied, voluntary providers of
eldercare should have less cause to fear meritless will contests by
disinherited heirs. There remain a few states, however, that apply a
different rule, rejected by the drafters of the Restatement. In these
states, at least with regard to some transfers, a claimant raises a
presumption of undue influence merely by demonstrating a
confidential relationship, without any showing of suspicious
circumstances.288 Under this rule, if the court deems the provision of
eldercare by a child to constitute a confidential relationship, it would
raise a presumption of undue influence that would be difficult to
rebut, despite the absence of suspicious circumstances. Moreover,
even if the caregiver prevails, the court might not reimburse the
caregiver for the costs of litigation. 8 9 In order to protect caregivers
from meritless claims of undue influence, therefore, those jurisdictions
286 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3
cmts. f-h (2003).
I Id. § 8.3 cmt. h.
8 Jurisdictions following this rule for some donative transfers include Indiana,
Iowa, Maryland, Mississippi, and Utah. See Summit Bank v. Quake, 631 N.E.2d 13, 15
(Ind. 1994); Jackson v. Shrader, 676 N.W.2d 599, 604 (Iowa 2004); Upman v. Clarke,
753 A.2d 4, 9-10 (Md. 2000); Holmes-Pickett v. Holmes-Price, 961 So. 2d 674, 680
(Miss. 2007); Robertson v. Campbell, 674 P.2d 1226, 1233 (Utah 1983).
29 See Bailey v. Sawyer, No. 2050707, 2007 WL 4357396, at *9 (Ala. Civ. App.
Dec. 14, 2007) (holding that caregiving child who successfully defended undue
influence challenge by noncaregiving grandchildren could not recover attorney's fees
from contestants because latter "offered credible evidence in support of their theory of
[the] will contest").
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that have not already done so should embrace the better rule of the
Restatement.
290
In addition to adopting the Restatement rule concerning the
presumption of undue influence, states might consider the possibility
of adopting a "living probate" alternative. Through this mechanism, a
testator may establish testamentary capacity inter vivos.2 9 I Although
proposals for living probate differ in their details, the testator will
typically come before the court, produce the will, and establish the
necessary testamentary capacity through witness testimony or other
evidence. 92 Three U.S. jurisdictions, Arkansas, North Dakota, and
Ohio, currently offer such a system as an option for those who have
concerns about postmortem probate.293 Living probate admittedly has
not been particularly popular in the states that have it; critics have
argued it is expensive and unfair to presumptive takers under a will.
2 94
Some of these problems, however, may be specific to the "contest
model" that was adopted in Arkansas, North Dakota, and Ohio.
Moreover, these problems could be ameliorated by changing the
procedures involved.2 9 5  Although the Uniform Law Commission
considered adopting a Uniform Ante-Mortem Probate of Wills Act in
290 California recently enacted a statute that presumptively disqualifies non-family
"care custodians" from being beneficiaries of testamentary transfers from dependent
adults for whom they provide care. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350(a)(6) (West Supp.
2008). The new statute seems to conflict with previous California law on the subject
of undue influence, which has been characterized as more protective of testamentary
freedom than the law of other states. Horton, supra note 277 (manuscript at 6-8).
Although the new statute does not affect caregiving children directly, it embraces the
disfavored approach of applying bright-line rules for undue influence, as contrasted
with the balancing test of the Restatement. For an argument that traditional undue
influence doctrine is superior to California's new bright-line approach as applied to
unpaid caregivers, see Kwasneski, supra note 277, at 291-92.
291 See John H. Langbein, Living Probate: The Conservatorship Model, 77 MICH. L.
REV. 63, 63 (1978).
292 See id. at 63, 72, 77.
293 See ARK. CODE. ANN § 28-40-202 (2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08.1-01
(1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.081 (West 2005).
294 See Mary Louise Fellows, The Case Against Living Probate, 78 MICH. L. REV.
1066, 1080 (1980); see also WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act 1, sc. 4 (illustrating
complications antemortem estate division may involve).
29' Compare Langbein, supra note 291, at 77-85 (arguing that living probate should
incorporate principles currently applied in conservatorship proceedings), with
Gregory S. Alexander & Albert M. Pearson, Alternative Models of Ante-Mortem Probate
and Procedural Due Process Limitations on Succession, 78 MICH. L. REV. 89, 112-19
(1979) (proposing ex parte administrative proceeding instead).
University of California, Davis
1980, the Commission abandoned the idea.29 Now may be an
appropriate time to reconsider that project.297
Although living probate may be costly and cumbersome in some
cases, it allows the testator to choose whether the additional time and
expense is worth the security that living probate provides. The fact
that living probate is not used much in the states that have it may
reflect a lack of understanding of its benefits on the part of estate
planners and testators more than any intrinsic flaw in the concept.
Admittedly, the significance of will contests as a check on
testamentary freedom may not be as great as is sometimes assumed.298
Given current demographic trends,299 however, together with the
apparent trend among elderly persons to leave more property to
caregiving children, °° the number of will contests brought by
noncaregiving children may increase in the future. Any measures that
could further protect testamentary freedom should accordingly be
given serious consideration.
CONCLUSION
The ghost of Leona Helmsley, who may have inflicted a final
punishment on her grandchildren through disinheritance, casts a
shadow over the arguments for testamentary freedom. Rather than
focus on an unsympathetic spirit like Helmsley, however, we might
think of Mary Ellen Geist, a successful radio news anchor who,
according to the New York Times, left behind a lucrative career to care
full-time for her elderly parents in Michigan." 1 A self-sacrificing
daughter like Geist deserves to receive whatever property her parents
296 See Aloysius A. Leopold & Gerry W. Beyer, Ante-Mortem Probate: A Viable
Alternative, 43 ARK. L. REV. 131, 180-81 (1990).
297 See id. at 181-82; cf. Nicole Reina, Comment, Protecting Testamentary Freedom
in the United States by Introducing into Law the Concept of the French Notaire, 46 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 797 (2002-2003) (proposing that French Notaire system be adopted as
quasi-administrative way of assessing testator capacity at time will is drafted). In
crafting a workable antemortem probate regime, legislators and law reformers might
take note of existing probate mediation programs, which have been highly successful
and popular in some states. See Lela P. Love & Stewart E. Sterk, Leaving More than
Money: Mediation Clauses in Estate Planning Documents, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 539,
544-51 (2008).
298 See Schoenblum, supra note 61, at 614-15.
299 See supra notes 195-198 and accompanying text.
300 See Brown, supra note 238, at 217.
301 Gross, Forget the Career, supra note 200.
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choose to leave her by will, even if this might entail the partial or total
disinheritance of other kin.30 2
Under a system of forced heirship, a sibling of Geist would be
presumptively entitled to a share of the inheritance at death even if
that sibling's contributions to caregiving were minimal or nonexistent.
A family maintenance system would provide more flexibility to reward
or reimburse a caregiving child, but it would leave the final division of
the estate to a judge rather than the parents themselves. When a
parent is mentally competent and not subject to undue influence, and
chooses to reward a caregiving child with a greater share of the estate,
why should we disregard the parent's intent in order to benefit those
who offered no help when the parent needed it? No critic of
testamentary freedom has yet given a satisfactory answer to this
question. Those who sow in tears may not always reap in joy,3 °3 but
when this is the last wish of a parent for a caring child, it is not the
province of the law to interfere.
302 The New York Times story does not discuss the estate plan of Geist's parents,
but it does state that Geist is "sandwiched between two more traditional sisters, both
with spouses, children and less demanding careers." Id.
303 Cf. Psalm 126:5.

